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164                                            Socially Intelligent Agents

                             plies that joint attention and action capture intertwine with each other, playing
                             important roles in infants’ development of social communication. Therefore,
                             we have implemented in Infanoid the primordial capability of joint attention
                             and are working on that of action capture.
                               Social intelligence has to have an ontogenetic history that is similar to that
                             of humans and is open to further adaptation to the social environment; it also
                             has to have a naturalistic embodiment in order to experience the environment
                             in a way that is similar to humans’. Our ongoing attempt to foster Infanoid
                             will tell us the prerequisites (nature) for and developmental process (nurture)
                             of the artificial social beings that we can relate to.

                             Notes
                               1. Joint attention requires not only focusing on the same object, but also mutual acknowledgement
                             of this sharing action. We assume that joint attention before “nine-month revolution” [9] is reflexive—
                             therefore, without this mutual acknowledgement.
                             References

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