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Understanding Social Intelligence                                 23

                              2.     Folk-Theories: ’Naive’ Theories about Intelligence

                                There is reason to believe that people employ the same or similar psycholog-
                              ical and social strategies when making sense of artificially produced intelligent
                              behaviour as with real world intelligence (e.g., humans and animals). There
                              might be some minor variations in reception dependent on media (computer,
                              theatre, film or in everyday situations), or if the intelligence is thought to be
                              fictive/simulated or real/documentary - but the major bulk of employed psy-
                              chosocial skills will overlap (in the case of cinema characters, see [25]). We
                              will call such skills folk-theories, since they are knowledge and hypotheses
                              about the world, albeit of a ’naive’ and common-sense nature. People and cul-
                              tures employ such naive theories in many areas of everyday life, e.g., physics,
                              nature, psychology, energy, morality, causality, time and space [12]; [9]. For
                              our purposes, we will deal only with folk-theories about intelligent behaviour,
                              interpersonal situations, and social reality.
                                Although people have idiosyncratic expectations about intelligent behaviour,
                              forinstancespecificknowledgeaboutthepersonalityandhabitsofaclose friend,
                              folk-theories constitute the collectively shared knowledge in a social, cultural
                              or universal group of people. Folk-theories constitute users’ expectations about
                              intelligent behaviour. In order for the system to appear intelligent, it must meet
                              those expectations, at least on some level.
                                Elsewherewehavedescribedthese folk-theories in detail and given examples
                              of SIA systems that seek to accommodate these [26]. Here space allows only a
                              brief overview.

                              2.1     Examples of Folk-Theories
                                If intelligenceisembodiedinsomeform, thenpeoplehaveexpectations about
                              visual appearance and physical behaviour. People have visual expectations of
                              bodies’ configuration, arrangement and movement patterns, both in humans
                              and other forms of intelligent life [10]. People expect gestures and non-verbal
                              behaviour to be synchronized and appropriate to the situation in which they
                              occur [24] [6]. Behaviour related to gazing and personal space is also expected
                              to take place according to certain norms and conventions [7].
                                Surface behaviour of this kind, however, is never understood on its own.
                              Users will always try to make sense of such behaviour in more abstract terms.
                              Primitive psychology is a folk-theory about how basic needs such as hunger,
                              thirst, sexual drives, and pain work, and the different ways in which they are
                              related (e.g., hunger or thirst will disappear if satisfied, and that satisfaction
                              will fade over time until hunger or thirst reoccur). Folk-psychology constitutes
                              a common sense model about how people understand the interrelationships
                              between different sorts of mental states in other people (and in themselves),
                              and how these can be employed as common-sense explanations for external
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