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Developing Agents Who Can Relate to Us 43

7. Conclusion

If we want to put artificial agents truly into the "human-loop" then they will
need to be able to reciprocate our ability to relate to them, including relating to
them relating to us etc. In order to do this it is likely that the development of the
agent’s self-modelling will have to be co-developed with its modelling of the
humans it interacts with. Just as our self-modelling has started to be influenced
by our interaction with computers and robots [22], their self-modelling should
be rooted in our abilities. One algorithm for this has been suggested which
is backed up by a theory of the development of the human self. Others are
possible. I argue elsewhere that if we carry on attempting a pure design stance
with respect to the agents we create we will not be able to achieve an artificial
intelligence (at least not one that would pass the Turing Test) [13]. In addition
to this failure will be the lack of an ability to relate to us. Who would want
to put anything, however sophisticated, in charge of any aspect of our life if
it does not have the ability to truly relate to us - this ability is an essential
requirement for many of the roles one might want agents for.

References

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