Page 236 - Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies
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224 STUART HALL

            decentralized  form  of  labour  process  and  work  organization,  and,  as  a
            consequence, a decline of the old manufacturing base (and the regions and
            cultures associated with it) and the growth of the ‘sunrise’, computer-based,
            hi-tech  industries  and  their  regions.  Third,  there  is  the  hiving-off  or  a
            contracting-out of functions and services hitherto provided ‘in house’ on a
            corporate basis. Fourth, there is a leading role for consumption, reflected in
            such things as greater emphasis on choice and product differentiation, on
            marketing,  packaging  and  design,  on  the  ‘targeting’  of  consumers  by
            lifestyle, taste and culture rather than by the Registrar General’s categories
            of social class.
              Fifth,  there  has  been  a  decline  in  the  proportion  of  the  skilled,  male,
            manual working class and the corresponding rise of the service and white-
            collar  classes.  In  the  domain  of  paid  work  itself,  there  is  more  flexi-time
            and part-time working, coupled with the ‘feminization’ and ‘ethnicization’
            of  the  workforce.  Sixth,  there  is  an  economy  dominated  by  the
            multinationals,  with  their  new  international  division  of  labour  and  their
            greater  autonomy  of  nation-state  control.  Seventh,  there  is  the
            ‘globalization’ of the new financial markets. Finally, there is the emergence
            of new patterns of social divisions—especially those between ‘public’ and
            ‘private’ sectors and between the two-thirds who have rising expectations
            and the ‘new poor’ and underclasses of the one-third that is left behind on
            every significant dimension of social opportunity.
              It  is  clear  that  ‘post-Fordism’,  though  having  a  significant  reference  to
            questions  of  economic  organization  and  structure,  has  a  much  broader
            social  and  cultural  significance.  Thus,  for  example,  it  also  signals  greater
            social  fragmentation  and  pluralism,  the  weakening  of  older  collective
            solidarities and block identities and the emergence of new identities as well
            as the maximization of individual choices through personal consumption,
            as equally significant dimensions of the shift towards ‘post-Fordism’.
              Some  critics  have  suggested  that  ‘post-Fordism’  as  a  concept  marks  a
            return to the old, discredited base-superstructure or economic-determinist
            model according to which the economy determines everything and all other
            aspects  can  be  ‘read  off  as  simply  reflecting  that  ‘base’.  However,  the
            metaphor of ‘post-Fordism’ does not necessarily carry any such implication.
            Indeed, it is modelled on Gramsci’s earlier use of the term, ‘Fordism’, at the
            turn of the century to connote a whole shift in capitalist civilization (which
            Gramsci certainly did not reduce to a mere phenomenon of the economic
            base). ‘Post-Fordism’ should also be read in a much broader way. Indeed, it
            could  just  as  easily  be  taken  in  the  opposite  way—as  signalling  the
            constitutive role which social and cultural relations play in relation to any
            economic system. Post-Fordism as I understand it is not committed to any
            prior determining position for the economy. But it does insist—as all but
            the most extreme discourse theorists and culturalists must recognize—that
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