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20  Sustainable Cities and Communities Design Handbook


               On the positive side, accountability for mistakes under the traditional
            system is largely shifted to ratepayers with little recourse to investors. The
            example of Diablo Canyon nuclear plant is instructive. Cost overruns make the
            power too expensive to sell under normal expense recovery calculations, even
            though PG&E wanted to shift all the burden of cost to the ratepayers. The
            regulator, the CPUC, wanted the utility to absorb most of the burden. Finally a
            compromise was reached in which the power was sold to customers at a rate
            well above the average of other sources of power (12 cents/KWh), based on
            performance criteria.
               If performance was below a set level the balance would be absorbed by the
            company. In practice, before deregulation, the plant performed reliably above
            the minimum, and costs were passed on to consumers. Under deregulation,
            presumably, cost overruns on plants like Diablo Canyon would not be
            competitive and would lead to huge financial losses to the utility.
               From a conventional economic point of view, under regulation the public
            regulator protects the utility from some risk for the investment decisions that
            are made. The fact that the utility can pass on costs shifts some of the risk and
            allows for poor investment decisions. Under deregulation, this risk-buffering
            function will be removed, subjecting these decisions to competitive markets.
               A counterargument is needed, however. California’s experience has
            repeatedly shown how private companies would have made horrible decisions
            if it were not for the regulatory system to enforce restraint. If Diablo Canyon
            was a problem, one can only imagine the financial crisis of the utilities and the
            state if the 12 nuclear plants that were planned for construction were actually
            built. While the regulatory system is not capable of micromanaging or of
            assuring that all investment decisions are wise, the fact that there is a second
            opinion may lead on average to fewer mistakes.
               Good decisions are benefits for which there should be a public benefit, not
            just private gain, especially for those low-cost sources of power that result
            from the collaboration between the public through the regulator and the private
            utility. The benefits of the shared risk between the utility and the guaranteed
            pass through of the costs to the customer has made some projects feasible and
            has assured low costs of capital because investors sense a guaranteed return on
            their investment. Indeed the whole utility industry is more of a public trust
            than is an industry such as oil refining. Many of the resources used in the
            generation of power are derived from public lands, especially hydro, and the
            power lines are typically acquired through the use of eminent domain
            proceedings to force access or sale of land; the fact that power cannot be easily
            stored means that the entire integrated system is critical.

            Politicized Priorities Excluded

            The economists point to the fact that regulation reflects politicized priorities
            that counter the best economic interests of efficiency and low costs. The
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