Page 121 - The Making of the German Post-war Economy
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94    THE MAKING OF THE GERMAN POST-WAR ECONOMY

           that  provided reasonably  priced and specifically marked goods to the
           people. Additionally, a law to prosecute the forcing up of prices was
           passed by the Economic Council on 7 October 1948.  However, all these
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           measures had mixed success because they were limited in range and
           merely aimed at appeasing  the public. Thus criticism  on  Erhard’s
           economic policy regarding the timing of liberalisation  of the economy
           continued. Finally, the trade unions  headed by the labour union official
           Hans Böckler called for a general strike against Erhard’s economic policy.
           Although Ludwig Erhard publicly condemned this procedure  and
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           despite scepticism even among unionists, 9.2 million out of 11.7 million
           workers and employees in the Bizone observed the work stoppage on 12
           November 1948. However, the unions remained moderate in both their
           requests and approach as the strike was deliberately called for a Friday in
           order to avoid a spontaneous continuation that would interrupt the work
           – this overly cautious attitude on the part  of the unions was often
           criticised at a later stage as some saw a second fateful position of points
           and the reason for victory of Erhard’s economic-policy.
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             In view of the worsened public sentiment and the imminent communal
           and local elections in North Rhine-Westphalia, Schleswig-Holstein, Baden,
           Rhineland-Palatinate,  Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern, Lower Saxony and
           Berlin in autumn 1948,  Konrad Adenauer in particular was concerned
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           with  the implications  of the actions taken by the Administration for
           Economics for election results, and so criticised the insensitivity of  the
           parliamentary group and its economic policy which triggered the drastic
           rise in prices immediately prior to the elections.  Anticipating the
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           election campaign of  the SPD to attack  Erhard’s economic policy,
           Adenauer prompted the party and parliamentary group to point out the
           achievements of the latter which consequently became subject to political
           communication.  However, the CDU did not yet apply the notion
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           ‘Soziale Marktwirtschaft’ to its election campaign. Instead and contrary to
           Erhard’s view  who tried to avoid the dualism of control versus market
           economy by arguing that such an antithesis was obsolete and a synthesis
           provided the better option, the party campaigned with the polarising
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           slogan of ‘Free Market Economy versus Controlled Economy’  which
           had the effect of contrasting freedom with control, alluding to the
           inglorious years of NS dictatorship. However, it also meant that the CDU
           continuously had to clarify it did not opt for free capitalism but a socially
           oriented, regulated market economy. Thus the election campaign required
           a coordinated cooperation between parliamentary group and party as well
           as a coherent communication to the press and the public. Although
           Adenauer was committed in this regard  and affirmed Erhard’s earlier
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           appeal to the parliamentary group to cooperate with the press in order to
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