Page 171 - The Making of the German Post-war Economy

144 THE MAKING OF THE GERMAN POST-WAR ECONOMY

form of socialism limiting personal freedom, this contest assumed the
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form of a cultural conflict for all intents and purposes. Once the Union
parties occupied the field of socially oriented economic competence, it
became difficult for the SPD to respond adequately. Instead of providing
a viable economic alternative, Schumacher lapsed into anchorless
destructive criticism of Erhard’s economic policy. Whereas the latter could
legitimately claim credit for a constructive approach leading to economic
recovery, the aggressive class struggle polemic of the leader of the German
Social Democratic Party was increasingly perceived as obstructive to the
growing prosperity. Thus Kurt Schumacher forfeited public favour –
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whereas in October 1948 he had been regarded as the most competent
politician, by March of the following year, the public preferred Konrad
Adenauer – and the SPD lost votes among its former natural
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supporters. At the same time, the CDU/CSU increased their share of
votes among their target groups, namely refugees who had mainly voted
for the SPD in previous elections, and women who would have realised
the economic improvement soonest. As a matter of fact, 33 per cent of
the former opted for the Union parties and 29 per cent for the SPD
whereas among locals the percentages were exactly the other way round.
Similar was the relative voting behaviour of women: whereas 41 per cent
of all eligible female voters casted a ballot for the CDU/CSU and only 24
per cent for the SPD, conversely 21 per cent of all men gave their vote to
the Union parties and 34 per cent to the Social Democrats. Indeed, the
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CDU/CSU was increasingly identified with the economic and social
recovery which assured many Germans to vote for the union parties, but
the Union also fought more deeply for the public acceptance of its
economic model in the battle to choose such a model for post-war West
Germany. In abstaining from issuing merely dogmatic, ideological
programme statements that appealed to the party’s most faithful members
and a narrow segment of society, the CDU/CSU rather formed and
projected a party image that effectively attracted votes from varied
sociological groups.
After a relatively successful campaign in the run-up to the federal
elections dominated by economic policy, the political parties which had
campaigned for a common socio-political and economic programme,
namely the CDU, the CSU, and the FDP, formed a bourgeois coalition to
serve as West Germany’s first democratically elected federal government.
Given a favourable party ratio with the help of the DP, which had
received 4 per cent of the votes corresponding to 17 mandates, and also
due to fundamental ideological differences, an alliance with the SPD was
not seriously considered. By a majority of a single vote (202 out of 402
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seats), namely his own, Konrad Adenauer (CDU) was eventually invested