Page 95 - The Making of the German Post-war Economy
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68    THE MAKING OF THE GERMAN POST-WAR ECONOMY

           party conference in  Düsseldorf in  September 1948.  Here, the speakers
           campaigned for a combination of organised supply and free demand
           labelled  Regulierte Marktwirtschaft (Regulated Market Economy).  In
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           contrast to Agartz’s planned economy, Weisser’s conception of a Third
           Way and Nölting’s directed economy, the advocates of such a regulated
           market economy who also included the Senator for Economic Affairs in
           Hamburg, Karl Schiller, the Secretary General of the Länderrat, Heinrich
           Troeger, and the SPD’s spokesman for financial affairs in the Economic
           Council, Walter Seuffert, did not demand the nationalisation of
           production facilities and governmental control of the economy. Instead,
           they requested the democratisation of  the economy  via worker
           participation and the abandonment of direct governmental interference;
           only indirect measures were accepted to regulate the market.  While an
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           opinion poll among party members at the party convention signified that
           the majority of the SPD supported this change of direction in economic
           policy from a Planned to a Regulated Market Economy, the  party
           executive was hesitant to pass any declaration or manifesto as an outcome
           of the convention in 1948, but further on supported production control
           and nationalisation in particular cases.
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             In essence, two opposing parliamentary groups had emerged within the
           SPD: the followers of Viktor Agartz and a planned economy on the one
           side, and the supporters of a regulated market economy on the other. This
           inconsistency was both a sign for the continuing internal party debate on
           the  programmatic development  of economic policy, as well as for the
           insecurity triggered by the  unexpected success of  Erhard’s liberal
           economic policy. Various members of the SPD, such as the chairman of
           the SPD parliamentary group in the Economic Council, Erwin Schoettle,
           cautioned against an uncoordinated appearance and its consequences for
           public elections: ‘it is not so much the fact that we Social Democrats did
           not  have clear concepts, it is rather that our concepts are not yet
           coordinated.’  Even Erich Ollenhauer, representing Kurt Schumacher on
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           the party board due to the latter’s illness, criticised the SPD:

             We neither had the time, nor the energy, nor the people to develop
             [...] a programme in which  it is  in concrete terms stated, what
             practical politics and economic policy the Social Democracy would
             conduct in Germany in the near future. [...] The question whether we
             can  achieve  this task in the  coming  years will be  decisive for  the
             political future of the German Social Democracy.
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             Even during the campaign for the upcoming first federal elections in
           August 1949 the criticism levelled at the disunity regarding a coordinated
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