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As such, pillarisation as a social and political system did not survive the roaring Sixties.
Though it still resonates in the consensual and pragmatic political culture of ‘poulder
politics’, loyalty within the pillars, obedience towards the political elite, the culture of
secrecy and the inherent paternalism all came under pressure.In the following decades,
the landscape of politics,media and the populace changed substantially.The electorate,
leaving the Catholic and Protestant churches in droves, began to float, switching in the
first instance from the party of their own pillar to others of similar persuasion.The self-
evidence of the righteousness of the political elite was rocked.The media severed their
direct links with political parties and distanced themselves from the intimate symbiosis
and dependency these entailed. The partisan logic was replaced by a public logic in
which the media still very much respected decision makers and parties as the actors
setting the political agenda, but from a more critical distance and without closely
identifying with them. In a public logic the media appear as watchdogs, performing in
the public interest and from a sense of responsibility for the well being of the political
system and the democratic process.

Since the end of the 1980s, several dramatic changes in politics, media and the public
have left their traces on the form and style of political communication. Firstly, in the
domain of politics. With the disappearance of ideology and religion as the dominant
indicator of party policy, differences in stance or policy solutions became blurred. The
number of floating voters grew at every election and, especially at second order
elections, the number who turned-off completely increased as well. Party membership
fell to one of the lowest in Europe (Mair & Van Biezen, 2001), but at the same time,
membership of single-issue movements, albeit often in the form of ‘check book From Accommodation to Professionalisation? The Changing Culture and Environment of Dutch Political Communication
activism’, grew to one of the highest in Europe (Sociaal en Culturel Planbureau, 2000).
The rise and sudden death of populist politician Pim Fortuyn, nine days before the 2002
elections, had an even more dramatic effect on the existing political communication
culture. His naming and blaming of immigration policies, the anti-establishment
sentiments he professed in his debates with other politicians and with the media elite,
his alignment with the assumed plight of the ordinary people, made him an instant,
though controversial, success and a regular guest in talk and current affairs shows.
Through the magnifying glass of television his adversarial tone, style and culture, that
until then was considered anathema in the Netherlands, gained momentum and
further popularised anti-political cynicism.

The changes in the media are characterised by concentration, commercialisation and
competition. The newspaper press was hit by waves of mergers, resulting in three
publishers owning 90% of the market today, one of them being a UK financial investor,
and in the number of independent dailies falling from more than sixty after the Second
World War to just under thirty in 2004. With ‘de-reading’ and competition from
television, the press is in dire straights and anxiously looking for new, and especially
young, audiences. Television, where the pillarised structure continued to exist though
the political ‘colouring’ disappeared, saw the introduction, in 1989, of commercial 99