Page 47 - The Resilient Organization

34 Part One: Why Resilience Now?

An example of a strategy based on resource control is a statement that
was made by Condoleezza Rice, former secretary of state. According to
Luft and Korin [2007: 75–76 (in Fukuyama, 2007)], Secretary Rice said the
following to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2006:

We do have to do something about the energy problem. I can tell you
that nothing has really taken me aback more, as secretary of state,
than the way the politics of energy is . . . “warping” diplomacy around
the world. It has given extraordinary powers to some states that are
using that power in not very good ways for the international system,
states that would otherwise have very little power.

Another competitive approach is unison strategies, which emphasize the
role of coordination and collaboration. An organization rarely competes
alone, and increasingly, the various open or contract networks rise in
importance. Togetherness will make a difference here—whom to partner
with may also be a competitive issue, as the most desirable partners will
have a choice. Who would not want to be Google’s partner today (provided
that you can get a fair deal)? Its two competitors, Microsoft and Yahoo!,
have formed an alliance to fight Google in online advertising. Finally, there
are confrontational strategies, such as the historically ill-reputed divide-
and-conquer approach that works to deny the enemy (or the suppressed
people) the capability to work together so as to attack effectively.
Another such confrontational strategy is that of containment, famously
defined during the U.S. cold war with the Soviet Union (1947 to 1989) by
George Kennan, a career Foreign Service officer. “The main element of any
United States policy toward the Soviet Union,” Kennan wrote, “must be
that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian
expansive tendencies.” To that end, he called for countering “Soviet pres-
sure against the free institutions of the Western world” through the “adroit
and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting
geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneu-
vers of Soviet policy.” Such a policy, Kennan predicted, would “promote
tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or
the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.” (Source: www.state.gov/r/pa/
ho/time/cwr/17601.htm.)