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58             Part Two: Step 1. Managing the Consequences of Past Performance


            6. The organization has become “permanently failing” with stakehold-
               ers keeping the performance at the level they can benefit from (Meyer
               & Zucker, 1989).
            7. The core group gains legitimacy and therefore will be hard to unseat
               on performance grounds alone.


             So, to beat mediocrity, the core group has to be unseated. Otherwise, it
          has no incentive to stop milking the organizational cow. To do that, you
          will not only have to challenge its performance but demerit its legitimacy.
          This amounts to a coup d’état, a political revolution. Good luck! You’ll
          need it! (For examples of how to go about such a revolution, see Chapter
          10, “Case Study: Imaginative Thinking in Action—The Case of the
          ODDsters,” and Chapter 13, “Postcard No. 3 from San Jose, California:
          Tempered Radicalism and Management Practices That Stick.”)




          VERY LOW PERFORMANCE INVITES CALAMITY

          While it is possible to perpetuate mediocrity, very low performance has its
          destabilizing characteristics.
             Very low performance results in the diverging of the core group’s interests,
          as the organization can no longer sustain all of its elite. In the event of a major
          adversity that threatens the organization, the organization falls back on its
          old routines, which may be inappropriate (or even what got the company in
          present trouble in the first place). It is easy to fall into a failure trap (Levinthal
          & March, 1993) because even if a particular strategy might eventually work,
          there is either no patience for it, or time simply runs out before giving the
          strategy a chance to show its might. There is no time for experimental learn-
          ing or for developing a portfolio of strategic options. Usually huge risks need
          to be taken so that the organization has at least a chance of survival (which
          requires radical, yet untested and unrehearsed change). Turnaround is
          attempted, at huge human and financial costs. A corporate turnaround spe-
          cialist is called in. Attention tends to become focused inward, thus further iso-
          lating the organization from changes in its competitive environment.
             The company may have to purchase its momentary survival at the
          expense of future viability.
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