Page 131 - Cultural Studies Dictionary

DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL STUDIES

called language whose job it is to originate a fixed entity called ‘representational
meaning’. If we think of language as constituted by the use of marks and noises that
have temporarily stabilized uses related to the achievement of purposes, then words
108 ‘mean’ what we use them to do in the context of social practice. The endless play
of signification that Derrida explores is regulated and partially stabilized through
pragmatic narratives and social action so that the meaning of any given word is
stabilized by social knowledge of what it is used for, when, under what
circumstances and so forth.
Within cultural studies this stress on language as a practice derives from both
Bakhtin and Wittgenstein. For the latter, language is not best understood as a
metaphysical presence nor a coherent system but as a tool used by human animals
to coordinate their actions in the context of social relationships. The meaning of a
word lies in its use by living human beings in the context of a specific form of life.
Signification does not occur in a separate domain from other practices and all
practices signify. Meaning is the product of the indistinguishability of signs and
social practice. The metaphor of the ‘tool’ captures the idea that we do things with
language. That said, the concept of ‘using a tool’ should not be read as implying the
intentionality of a pre-existent subject. Rather, ‘use’ is acquired through our
acculturation and habituation into social practices and their associated justifications.

Links Anti-essentialism, dialogic, discourse, holism, language-game, meaning,
poststructuralism, pragmatism, representation, semiotics, signs, structuralism

Language-game The concept of a language-game is strongly associated with the
ordinary language philosophy of the ‘later’ Wittgenstein, for whom the meaning of
words derives from their usage in a complex network of relationships between signs,
and not from some essential characteristic or referent. Thus meaning is contextual
and relational; it depends on the relationships between words that have ‘family
resemblances’ and on specific utterances in the context of pragmatic narratives.
Wittgenstein argues that seeking out universal theoretical explanations for
language is not a useful way to proceed. Language is not a metaphysical presence
or structure but a tool used by human animals to coordinate their actions in the
context of social relationships. Thus the meaning of a word is said to be its use in
the language, so what matters is the particular circumstances under which a word
or sentence is actually used. Hence for Wittgenstein, a meaningful expression is one
that can be given a use by living human beings as a form of life.
The anti-essentialism at the core of the concept of the language-game is apparent
in Wittgenstein’s discussion of the word ‘game’ itself. Thus, the meaning of the
word ‘game’ does not derive from some special or essential characteristic of a game
but through a complex network of relationships and characteristics only some of
which are ever present in a specific game. Hence, games are constituted by a set of
‘family resemblances’. Members of a family may share characteristics with one
another without necessarily sharing any specific feature in common. In this sense
the word game is relational; the meaning of card-game depends on its relations to
board-game and ball-game.