Page 187 - The Voice of Authority

And not everyone wants to hear bad news. In fact, a sur-
vey by Sirota Survey Intelligence suggests that one-third
(35 percent) of employees believe that their own compa-
nies do not encourage reporting vital information up the
chain—even if it’s bad news. Consider the difference be-
tween Churchill’s and Hitler’s nose for news.
In l941, Winston Churchill set up the Central Statistical
Office as part of the Cabinet Office, with the official pur-
pose of collecting coherent statistical information regu-
larly that could be reported and accepted for use without
question in governmental discussions. According to those
close to him, he feared that people around him would spin
the facts and not give him the straight truth—including the
bad news.
Hitler, on the other hand, was not as perceptive about
human nature. He surrounded himself with generals
whom he mistrusted and who mistrusted him. According
to historian Stephen E. Ambrose, writing in D-Day, “the
generals’ mistrust of Hitler was worth a king’s ransom to
the Allies.”
When the Allied forces landed on D-Day, Hitler’s gen-
erals dared not wake him from sleep to get the appropri-
ate orders to move. Field Marshall Rundstedt concluded
that the airborne landings were on such a large scale that
they could not be a mere deception maneuver (as some of
his staff argued). He wanted armor on the coasts to meet
the attack. Ambrose writes: “Rundstedt’s reasoning was
sound, his action decisive, his orders clear. But the panzer
divisions were not under his command. They were in
[Oberkommando der Wehrmacht] OKW reserve. To save
precious time, Rundstedt had first ordered them to move
out, then requested OKW approval. OKW did not approve.
At 0730 Alfred Jodl [Chief of Operation Staff in OKW] in-
formed Rundstedt that the two divisions could not be

Is It Circular? 175