Page 136 - Toyota Under Fire

THE RECALL CRISIS

established. The presentation in question was simply an illus-
tration of this fact—by working with the NHTSA, the regula-
tory affairs department had demonstrated that the design of
specific all-weather floor mats, not a generic problem with floor
mats or other items that could be related to SUA, such as faulty
throttles, was the most likely cause of pedal entrapment. The
division members were proud that they had done their job and
saved the company a lot of money by preventing a recall of
throttles or other equipment that was not faulty and would not
have fixed the issue.

The Gap in Perception between
Toyota Japan and the United States

The sticky pedal was Toyota’s second major recall affecting more
than a million vehicles in three months. On top of that, for a
public that was confused about unintended acceleration—what it
meant and what the possible causes were—this appeared to be yet
another grudging admission from Toyota that there were underly-
ing defects in its vehicles, defects that senior executives from TMS
had vociferously denied in the November recall announcements
and as recently as December 9 in a letter to the editor of the
Los AngelesTimes. Those same TMS executives were not happy to
learn in January that TMC in Japan had been so slow to recog-
nize the extent of the problem and the impact it would have on
further eroding trust in Toyota. As Irv Miller explained: “When
the Avalon incident occurred in December, it was public knowl-
edge. My feeling then and now is that we had to get in front of
this, stand up, take our lumps, and start the healing process.”

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