Page 180 - Toyota Under Fire

RESPONSE AND THE ROAD TO RECOVER Y

any investigations into specific incidents until the NASA study
was completed. That study was originally scheduled to be com-
pleted by the end of August 2010, but wasn’t completed until
February 9, 2011, when the results, exonerating Toyota of elec-
tronic defects, were released.
That decision apparently didn’t sit well with everyone at the
NHTSA. In June, George Person, a newly retired senior staffer,
provided the Wall Street Journal with the details of the investiga-
tions of SUA allegations in Toyota vehicles up to that point. Per-
son provided the data on condition of anonymity, and the Journal
did not initially report how it had obtained the report. That led
to accusations that Toyota had violated confidentiality and leaked
the reports. Person came forward a few days later to identify him-
self as the source. Person told the Journal that the decision not
to release the report was made at the highest levels of the agency
over the objections of some senior NHTSA officials. The report
was based on a study of more than 50 vehicles involved in a crash
in which SUA was suspected or alleged. In some cases, data were
not recoverable. Of the 51 cases for which data were available, 50
turned out to be the result of pedal misapplication (in most cases
not pressing the brake at all, but in some cases either pressing it
in the middle of the crash cycle and releasing it or pressing it very
late in the crash cycle), while 1 was a case of pedal entrapment
caused by too many floor mats in the vehicle.
At the same time, more and more analysts and columnists be-
gan looking more deeply into the data and the history of SUA
and challenging public perceptions. For instance, Jerry Anwyl of
Edmunds.com wrote an open letter to Transportation Secretary
Ray LaHood, saying: “Every car company has a level of complaint
volume from consumers relating to vehicles that suffered unin-
tended acceleration. As poor as their response has been, Toyota

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