Page 211 - CULTURE IN THE COMMUNICATION AGE
P. 211

STEPHEN  HINERMAN

             value judgment on such changes without fully understanding those changes in
             a larger context easily leads to flawed judgments.
               Ultimately, modern fame assumes importance not for what it says about the
             feelings or reputations of famous people but for what it does for audiences.
             Some  scholars,  particularly  those  who  work  from  the  ‘top  down’  in  their
             critiques  of  modern  stardom,  forget  that  it  is  the  audience  that  determines
             celebrity. These critics sometimes become more seduced by the aura of stars
             than the masses they fret about so much.
               The  impact  of  time  and  space  on  audiences’  relationships  with  famous
             people has always been vital to understanding how renown is granted. We can
             find examples as far back in time as classical Greece. When Aristotle in the
             Rhetoric  describes  the  qualities  of  people  who  have ethos,  and  are  able  to
             engender emulation in others, he is telling us about fame:

                 They are the ones who possess . . . courage, wisdom, public o ffice; for
                 men in office can render service to many, and so can generals, orators,
                 and all who have the like power and influence. Emulation is excited,
                 too,  by  those  who  have  many  imitators;  or  whose  acquaintance  or
                 friendship many desire; or whom many admire, or whom we ourselves
                 admire. And it is excited by those whom poets or panegyrists celebrate
                 in praises and encomiums.
                                                        (Aristotle 1960: 130)

             Aristotle  places  the  onus  of  fame  not  on  individual  persons  but  on  the
             collective audience. It is the community which bestows fame. The only way to
             understand fame, therefore, is to understand those who emulate the famous and
             how they do so.
               In Aristotle’s time, fame was rooted firmly in time-bound expectations of
             the audience at the very moment the famous sought to transcend those tem-
             poral boundaries. Fame was a set of historical valuations, an accumulation of
             actions and subsequent public manifestations of praise which granted a kind of
             immortality.  Reputation  in  the  ancient  world,  therefore,  resulted  from  an
             accretion of historical, lineal acts, viewed from a distance over time, and  finally
             valued and fixed by public speeches of praise or blame emanating from the
             marketplace or the battlefield. Public honoring of renown was an important
             aspect of classical culture, given how the famous exempli fied, personified, and
             modeled ideal behavior and values. Ulf Hannerz notes that this phenomenon
             still occurs in many non-media cultures: ‘small-scale, non-media societies make
             sure that much meaning is effortlessly kept alive at least in microtime, through
             redundancy. Knowledge and beliefs are inscribed into the environment, and
             personified by individuals’ (1992: 147). These renowned individuals mark the
             ‘ideal life’ of the community.
               Aristotle also implied that classical fame depended not only on accumulated
             time  but  on  geographically  discrete  space.  The  ‘technologies’  for  spreading

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