Page 49 - Accelerating out of the Great Recession
P. 49

ACCELERATING OUT OF THE GREAT RECESSION


        gram is aimed at domestic infrastructure projects and the devel-
        opment of new industries, particularly for the creation of export
        goods, rather than at stimulation of domestic private consump-
        tion. The program also has protectionist elements that prevent
        the participation of foreign companies.
           More important is the simple arithmetic. As we have said,
        the U.S. consumer accounts for about 18.8 percent of the
        world’s GDP. In 2008, the entire Chinese economy accounted
        for 6.4 percent of world GDP when using current exchange
        rates. Even at growth rates of 8 percent, it will take years for
        China to make up for the losses in aggregate demand resulting
        from the deleveraging process in the United States.
           Thus, as important an economy as China is, it will not
        singlehandedly be able to pull the world out of its economic
        doldrums.
           Olivier Blanchard, economic director of the IMF, sees the
        rebalancing of trade flows as a precondition for economic
        recovery and fears that it will not be achieved fast enough to
        prevent an anemic recovery in the United States. He observes,
        “Were that to happen, one can imagine various scenarios:
        political pressure may be resisted, the fiscal stimulus could be
        phased out, and the U.S. recovery might falter. Or fiscal
        deficits might be maintained for too long, leading to issues of
        debt sustainability and worries about U.S. government bonds
        and the dollar, and causing large capital flows from the United
        States. Dollar depreciation may take place, but in a disorderly
        fashion, leading to another episode of instability and high
        uncertainty, which could itself derail the recovery.” And he
        concludes,  “Coordination across countries is likely to be as
        crucial during the next few years as it was during the most
        intense part of the crisis.” 5



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