Page 223 - An Introduction to Political Communication Fifth Edition

Intro to Politics Communication (5th edn)-p.qxp 9/2/11 10:55 Page 202

COMMUNICATING POLITICS
non-existent weapons of mass destruction did follow the invasion, fuelled by
the gradual deterioration of the security situation in Iraq almost from the
moment that George W. Bush prematurely declared victory. As noted above,
this criticism is generally accepted to have had a significant impact on the
outcome of the 2005 UK election, as well as the 2004 US election. Although
neither incumbent was defeated, the results showed huge anxiety and
dissatisfaction with the conduct of the Iraq intervention.
As to the conduct of military public relations in the invasion of 2003, a
number of lessons were learnt from previous conflicts, including the 1991
Gulf war and the 1998 intervention in the former Yugoslavia. From the
former, military PR specialists adapted the strategy of ‘pooling’ journalists
and adopted a policy of embedding them with active fighting units. 600 US
and British journalists were integrated into the Coalition forces. On the one
hand, this gave them unprecedented access to engagements as they happened,
allowing audiences across the world to view them live, even if only on fuzzy
video illuminated by green night lights. From the former Yugoslavia, and the
mistakes made during the US-UK intervention in Kosovo in particular,
officials learnt that honesty and openness were preferable to cover up and
denial. A UK Ministry of Defence spokesperson stated in March 2003 that
‘what you have got to do is to be more honest about your mistakes. Ideally
what we want to do is tell the press that something has gone wrong before
they find out through other sources’ (quoted in McNair, 2006, p. 196). The
policy of maintaining control while allowing access had some success, at
least in that phase of the conflict when it seemed that all was going according
to plan. The military and the media expressed general satisfaction with how
the policy was implemented during Operation Iraqi Freedom, while audi-
ences all over the world witnessed a conflict unfold with greater proximity
and immediacy than ever before in history. Propaganda and disinformation
were used, of course, as in all wars, but on this occasion the overall impres-
sion given was one of mutually beneficial cooperation between the military
and the media. This perception would change later in the occupation, as
more and more civilians became casualties, Coalition troops were implicated
in atrocities such as torture at Abu Ghraib, and the representatives of the
media were subject to numerous ‘friendly fire’ incidents. In the period since
Operation Iraqi Freedom, US and allied forces have maintained a presence
in Iraq and Afghanistan, accompanied by careful communication strategies
intended to persuade domestic publics of the legitimacy and value of the
military objectives for which hundreds and then thousands of young soldiers
(not to mention vastly more civilians) were dying. In the summer of 2010,
just as this edition went to press, the Obama administration experienced a
conspicuous failure of communication when its military chief in Afghanistan,
General Stanley McChrystal, was the subject of a major Rolling Stone
feature article. The article profiled the general and his staff as they went on
a drinking spree in Paris, and quoted them making disrespectful and dis-

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