Page 215 - An Introduction to Political Communication Second Edition

AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

Throughout the Falklands conflict there was a fundamental tension
in official information policy. Ministry of Defence advice issued to
journalists on the task force included the recognition that ‘the essence
of successful warfare is secrecy. The essence of successful journalism
is publicity’ (quoted in Harris, 1983, p. 16). This is not strictly true,
however. Publicity, as we noted above, is now viewed as an instrument
of war, particularly by the politicians who must take responsibility
for its execution in a democracy. Thus, while the military authorities
and the Defence Ministry pursued a policy of non-cooperation with
the media, the government as a whole required media publicity for
its symbolic campaign.
Mercer et al. note that ‘from the outset the Prime Minister sought
to rally party, national and international opinion’ (1987, p.18)
through such displays as the departure of the task force. In the
words of a serving admiral at the time, ‘it was very important to
give tangible evidence of military power to back up the diplomatic
effort. It was very much a PR show—to show the Fleet leaving,
both for British opinion, to rally them behind the ships and as an
expression of power for world opinion and, of course, the enemy’
(Ibid., p.19).
For the reporting of good news, then, the media were most
welcome, and treated accordingly. Beyond this role as transmitters
of symbolic demonstrations of military power, the media were also
used to confuse and ‘disinform’ the enemy. When, for example,
landings on the Falklands were being prepared, misleading
information was leaked to the media, thence to the public and, of
course, the Argentinians.
Whether or not one agrees with the ‘justness’ of the Falklands
War and the government’s information policy during it, there is no
doubt, as Robert Harris concludes, ‘that in many respects the British
people were not given the facts during the Falklands war. Information
was leaked out slowly and often reluctantly by the Ministry of
Defence; rumours were allowed to circulate unchecked; and the British
authorities frequently used the media as an instrument with which
to confuse the enemy’ (1983, p.92). Such tactics may or may not
have contributed to British military success in the Falklands, but
they certainly helped to revive the political fortunes of the Thatcher
government, which went on to win landslide general election victories
in 1983 and 1987. In this sense, the conflict—and media reportage
of it—had major political ramifications.
Harris also notes that ‘the Falklands conflict may well prove the
last war in which the armed forces are completely able to control

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