Page 221 - An Introduction to Political Communication Second Edition
P. 221

AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

            chosen to challenge the strategic interests of the US and its allies by
            threatening Arab oil reserves.
              While many questioned the allies’ motivations for going to war
            with Iraq, once it had begun there were few in the West prepared to
            take Hussein’s side. Iraq was not Vietnam, or Nicaragua, a fact
            reflected in the media’s enthusiastic adoption of the allies’ perspective
            on events. As Bruce Cummings observes of media coverage: ‘the Gulf
            War sequence reversed Vietnam: whereas television served [US] state
            policy in the first phase of the war and questioned it in the second
            (after Tet), Gulf coverage interrogated the war in the months before
            Desert Storm, and served the state once the storm broke’ (1992,
            p.103).
              There was, in short, an exceptionally high degree of consensus
            around the legitimacy of allied war aims, shared even by those who
            criticised the sanitisation and voluntary censorship of coverage
            exhibited by the main media. To an extent not seen since the Second
            World War, operation Desert Storm was viewed as a ‘just’ war.
              The allies’ carefully controlled account of the conflict was not
            entirely unchallenged, however. Earlier we noted that throughout
            the conflict there were Western journalists present in the Iraqi
            capital, Baghdad. CNN’s Peter Arnett, in particular, provided
            information which, if not hostile to the allies’ cause, frequently
            contradicted the public relations emanating from Riyadh. When,
            for example, US bombs destroyed an air-raid shelter in Baghdad,
            killing hundreds of civilians and shattering the concept of a ‘clean’
            war, CNN and other Western television organisations were present
            to film the aftermath, disseminating images of death and destruction
            to the global audience. Hussein’s administration of course welcomed
            such coverage, and tolerated the presence of Western journalists in
            Baghdad in the belief that they could, by their focus on civilian
            casualties, cause greater damage to the allies’ military effort than
            to Iraq’s. Fortunately for the Iraqis (if not for Hussein) civilian
            casualties were low, given the ferocity of the allies’ bombing, and
            the effort to have Iraq portrayed as the wronged party was
            unsuccessful. Eventually, most of the Western journalists were
            expelled from the country, with the exception of CNN and a handful
            of other organisations.
              Hussein also used Western media to pursue a more ‘pro-active’
            public relations campaign. Before hostilities began Hussein was filmed
            greeting the foreigners who had been trapped in Kuwait by his
            invasion. Most notoriously, he attempted to use British children to
            portray himself as a kindly ‘Uncle Saddam’ figure, but succeeded

                                       204
   216   217   218   219   220   221   222   223   224   225   226