Page 224 - An Introduction to Political Communication Second Edition
P. 224
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL COMMUNICATION
To draw attention to the ‘hyperreal’ quality of the Gulf War as
experienced by those not in the front line, and the extent of media
management from all sides, is not necessarily to criticise these features.
Few would deny that there are circumstances in which such techniques
are appropriate; in which manipulation, distortion, and even
deception may be legitimate instruments of warfare. There are just
wars, and the Gulf conflict may be the closest the world has come to
one since the defeat of the Nazis. One might also argue, however,
that in the history of post-Second World War conflicts, the same or
similar techniques have been used by the Western powers in military
expeditions of far more dubious legitimacy—Grenada, Nicaragua,
the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, to name but three. In each
of these situations, ‘enemies’ were created, and ‘threats’ manufactured
by military public relations specialists, while journalists were
prevented or dissuaded from presenting alternative accounts of the
‘truth’.
Perhaps the most disturbing feature of the Gulf War as political
communication was its demonstration of how readily such messages
as the incubator story were accepted and passed on by journalists
eager for materials to confirm their image of Hussein as a tyrannical
violator of human rights. When ‘Gulf War II’ threatened to break
out in 1998, lurid and frightening images of the biological and nerve
gas weapons which Saddam Hussein was allegedly building, and
which could wipe out a Western European city, were reported by the
media as uncontestable truths, rather than what they were—
unsubstantiated speculations which were being used to whip up public
opinion behind another military campaign against Iraq. Few observers
doubt that Saddam Hussein was in 1991, and remained afterwards,
a murderous individual, heading a genocidal, fascist regime. This
does not excuse journalists from the responsibility of reporting his
government’s activities, and those of the Western powers ranged
against him, with a degree of emotional distance and objectivity,
especially if this could mean the difference between peace and war.
In future conflicts the issues may not be so clear cut as they have
been in relation to Iraq, the moral and military choices more
ambiguous. As media management techniques advance and grow
ever more all-encompassing, how are we as citizens of the twenty-
first century to give ‘informed consent’ to our governments’ military
policies, and prevent unjustified military adventures?
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