Page 106 - Artificial Intelligence for the Internet of Everything

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(e.g., intellectual property–protection reasons, and privacy reasons unrelated
to the incident). This very complex set of circumstances will require signif-
icant attention and government and industry collaboration. Yet without evi-
dence that cyber attacks on automobiles are actually occurring, it would take
very strong leadership to push through measures allowing law enforcement
to address cyber attacks on automobiles in an anticipatory manner.
Recognizing the natural desire to avoid the costs associated with antic-
ipating cyber-security need, perhaps historical roles in safety regulation can
provide a starting point for government involvement. Historically, with cer-
tain exceptions, safety analyses have not considered cyber attacks to be a
safety issue. The trend of advancing highly automated physical systems into
general use raises the issue of whether or not the safety communities (gov-
ernment and industry) should start to address this intersection. In doing so, it
becomes necessary to understand and account for the relationships between
the systems at risk and other interconnected and interrelated systems that can
be a pathway for generating a cyber attack. If one starts down this path, some
new and complex issues arise.

5.2.2 Mission-Based Cybersecurity

In this section, an integrated set of interconnected systems’ combined mis-
sion is considered as the point of departure regarding anticipation of cyber
attacks. The technology-focused research efforts that the author has been
engaged in have addressed a number of illuminating scenarios. For example,
as part of addressing UAV cybersecurity solutions, a variety of potential
cyber attacks were considered as potential concerns that call for defensive
capabilities. For illustration purposes consider cyber attacks aimed at mod-
ifying a UAV’s flight path, adversely impacting its ability to carry out its
safety-related surveillance mission (e.g., monitoring an oil or gas pipeline).
Such an attack could, for example, accompany a physical attack on the pipe-
line. One way for an attacker to accomplish this outcome is to modify
mission-related waypoints that have been entered into the navigation system
on board the aircraft. One possible solution addresses a cyber-attack in
which the ground-based portion of the UAV system is utilized by the
attacker to automatically send surveillance-disrupting changes to the navi-
gation waypoints loaded on board the aircraft. These changes would cause
the aircraft to be routed in a manner that prevents gathering of the critical
information the mission was intended to collect. A potential solution could
involve monitoring the aircraft’s navigation system and the pilot’s data-entry