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The Value of Information and the Internet of Things  161


                 Modifying Eq. (9.1), now differently than Eq. (9.17), we have:

                                          l  c,  l 2 support of L
                                                                         (9.26)
                                          0,     otherwise
                             EðVjb,c,lÞ¼
              We have that (C and L still independent):
                                          Z
                                            EðVjc,lÞ  f ðcÞdc            (9.27)
                                  EðVjlÞ¼
                                           
                                          Z
                                            ðl  cÞ  f ðcÞdc              (9.28)
                                        ¼
                                           
                                           Z        Z
                                        ¼ l  f ðcÞdc    c   f ðcÞdc      (9.29)
                                                    
                                                                         (9.30)
                                        ¼ l  EðCÞ
              when l 2 support of L.
                 Example 9.3 [L¼ U½0,LŠ and EðCÞ ¼ 1=2] Below we show a plot of
              EðVjlÞ¼ l  0:5 against l for L¼ U½0,2Š and EðCÞ ¼ 1=2(Fig. 9.7).
                 For Example 9.3, dhVie ¼ 1:5, achieved when b ¼ 2.
                                     b
                 Note that EðVjbÞ is a linear function of b ¼ l and that it can be negative,
              zero (once), or positive depending on the support of L. Furthermore, the
              maximum of EðVjbÞ is achieved when b is the largest value of l in the support
              of L. Heuristically, another way of saying this is that the maximum is
              achieved for the largest value of l such that P(L 2 (l   dx, l))6¼0.


                  E (V | /)
                  1.5



                  1.0


                  0.5



                                                                          l
                                0.5          1.0          1.5          2.0


                 –0.5
              Fig. 9.7 EðVjbÞ such that EðCÞ ¼ 1=2, and the company knows the lowest bid,
              distributed as L¼ U½0,2Š.
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