Page 97 - Artificial Intelligence in the Age of Neural Networks and Brain Computing

2. Hermeneutics 85

which became independent fields, the second-order cybernetics emphasized the
concepts of autonomy, self-organization, cognition, and the role of the observer in
modeling a system. Cybernetic systems, such as organisms and social systems,
are studied by another cybernetic system, namely the observer [28]. Von Foerster
was a radical constructivist. According to this view, knowledge about the external
world is obtained by preparing models on it. The observer constructs a model of
the observed system; therefore, their interactions should be understood “by cyber-
netics of cybernetics,” or “second-order” cybernetics. It is difficult to reconstruct
the story, but it might be true that a set of cyberneticians, who felt the irreducible
complexity of the system-observer interactions, abandoned to build and test formal
models, and used a verbal language using metaphors. They were the subjects of
well-founded critics for not studying specific phenomena. Constructivism is an
important element of new cognitive systems. About the history of second-order
cybernetics see Ref. [29].

2.2 HERMENEUTICS OF THE BRAIN
Ichiro Tsuda [30,31] applied the principles of hermeneutics to the brain by using
chaos as a mechanism of interpretation. He suggested that (1) a particular chaotic
phenomenon, namely chaotic itinerancy, may be identified with what he calls herme-
neutic process; (2) in opposition to the idea that “the brain is a computer, the mind is
a programmer,” “. the brain can create even a programmer through the interpreta-
tion process expressed by chaotic itinerancy .” [31].
In Ref. [17] it was asked: how, if at all, two extreme approaches, the “device
approach” and the “philosophical approach” could be reconciled. It was suggested
by turning to the philosophical tradition that hermeneutics, that is, the “art of inter-
pretation,” which is neither monist nor dualist a priori, can be applied to the brain.
Further, it was stated that the brain is both the “object” of interpretation as well as the
interpreter: therefore the brain is itself a hermeneutic device. For our own dialog
with Tsuda, see Ref. [32].
The preunderstanding in hermeneutics might be related to the “Bayesian brain”
hypothesis [33]. The prior probability distribution, often called the prior, is the prob-
ability distribution that would express one’s beliefs about this quantity before some
evidence is taken into account, and might play the role of the preunderstanding.
There seems to be an interesting analogy that action-perception cycle was analyzed
in a Bayesian framework [34].

2.3 THE BRAIN AS A HERMENEUTIC DEVICE
The brain can be considered as different types of devices. Among these: the brain
can be seen as a thermodynamic device; a control device; a computational device;
an information storing, processing, and creating device; or a self-organizing
device. The device approach is strongly related to the dynamic metaphor of the