Page 60 - Berkshire Encyclopedia Of World History Vol Two

comparative borders and frontiers 409

but hundreds of miles of fortifications and thousands of 238, 240). He focused attention on the struggle for con-
archaeological sites in Africa, Asia, and Europe have trol of marginal lands and a series of transitional zones
yielded new information. At the very least the Romans between “full Chinese order” and “full steppe order” (Lat-
seem to have been operating strategically in similar ways timore 1951, 498).
in different regions, in some cases setting the agenda, in Historian Andrew Waldron has convincingly argued
other cases reacting to circumstances. Although barriers that “there was no single Great Wall in the Chinese past”
clearly were designed to deal with medium-intensity (Waldron 1988, 69) and that pre-nineteenth-century Chi-
threats and were supported by intricate systems of gar- nese observers rarely spoke of a single structure. Euro-
risons and communication networks, the contemporary pean notions of a “Great Wall of China” evolved during
sources do not explicitly define the parameters of grand centuries, influencing modern Chinese perceptions and
strategy. culminating in the myth (developed during the late nine-
Rather than separate Romans from “barbarians,” the teenth century) that the “Great Wall” is the only human-
boundary fortifications often facilitated contact between made object visible from outer space.Waldron traces how
Romans and their neighbors. Archaeologist Peter Wells simple earthen fortifications (first mentioned in 656 BCE)
has documented the impact of Roman expansion along emerged, were unified in a system of walls under the Qin
the Rhine: “The Roman expansion into temperate Europe dynasty (221–206 BCE), and finally, many centuries later,
can be productively viewed as a process that involved became identified as an ancient structure ranging for
interaction between peoples, negotiation with political more than 9,000 kilometers. These ancient walls were
leaders, and sometimes combat” (Wells 1999, 95). variously built, abandoned, repaired, and abandoned
Archaeology, inscriptions, and texts demonstrate that once again. Furthermore, wall building was only one of
the lines between Romans and their neighbors were many strategies for dealing with the nomads. Further-
more blurred than previously thought. Many non- more, we can draw no direct correlation between wall
Romans were living in Roman territories and employed building and the weakness of the Chinese state. Finally,
by the Roman army. Even groups living far beyond the the massive brick and stone walls that are commonly vis-
border in an expansive frontier zone were influenced by ited by tourists near Beijing were built relatively late, dur-
Roman culture and participated in trade networks. ing a new period of wall building by the Ming dynasty
Objects traded hundreds of miles from the farthest (1368–1644).
Roman forts suggest connections rather than separation. Recent scholars have likewise looked at interactions
Historians examining more than two millennia of across the Chinese walls. The walls themselves were
interaction between China and Inner Asia have faced sim- never able to enforce a complete dichotomy between the
ilar problems of interpretation. Here, too, walls provide Middle Kingdom (China) and the “outer darkness”
visual evidence of ancient divisions, but these walls are beyond its borders. Several studies have demonstrated
subject to varying interpretations. In his classic study how nomadic confederacies thrived because of interac-
Inner Asian Frontiers Asian studies expert Owen Latti- tion with China. Anthropologist Thomas Barfield has
more spoke of the Great Wall of China as a dividing line argued that the success of nomadic confederacies de-
ordained by the environment. It roughly approximated pended upon a ruler’s abilities to secure resources from
an ecological fault line between lands to the south, which China. To do this, he might organize raids or act as an
were conducive to agriculture, and to the north, which intermediary between China and the steppe. Often no-
were the domain of pastoral nomadism. For him the madic confederacies avoided conquering Chinese terri-
Great Wall was a kind of “optimum limit of growth” for tory and preferred to use their power to extract resources,
the Chinese empire, but he emphasized that a linear subsidies, or access to trade. Historian Sechin Jagchid has
boundary could not be established (Lattimore 1951, argued even that trade was the “essential element that