Page 224 - Encyclopedia Of World History Vol V

warfare—steppe nomads 2001

and strung against its natural curve, could send light could arrive on the scene. The Mongols deployed this
arrows several hundred yards with some accuracy or advantage offensively, using their efficient communica-
direct heavier arrows over shorter ranges with dangerous tion system to bring several units to a battlefield from dif-
penetrating power. Nomadic horse archers were skilled ferent directions, often inducing panic in their enemies
at harassing enemy formations from a distance, retreat- and giving them the impression of being surrounded by
ing when counterattacks were launched, only to return to “hordes” far larger than they in fact were (the Mongols,
the attack when the enemy advance became scattered or like other nomads, often fought outnumbered against
disorganized. Feigned flights were thus a standard part sedentary armies). But mobility was most useful defen-
of the nomadic tactical repertoire. Elite nomadic warriors sively, in combination with the logistics of steppe war-
—tribal nobles and the favored forces of larger coalitions fare.When threatened by superior forces, nomadic forces
—often wore armor that included some sewn-on metal could simply withdraw onto the steppes. It was very dif-
plates and was heavier than the leather and raw silk pro- ficult for a large infantry army to follow them into this
tection worn by regular horse-riding archers; the elite terrain because the land could not support armies that
forces also wielded lances and even swords.This heavier lived on grain supplies. Carting supplies in was both pro-
element in nomadic armies could engage in hand-to- hibitively expensive and subject to severe range restric-
hand combat, delivering a decisive charge against an tions, as the oxen or horses used to pull carts of food
enemy softened up by archery. Nomadic armies often also had to be fed. Thus, beyond perhaps a four days’
drew up for battle in a broad, shallow crescent forma- march from a supply depot, even armies with large sup-
tion, the wings thrown forward with the aim of encir- ply trains ran out of food—never mind that water sup-
cling the enemy flanks. But flexibility was the key plies were also often problematic. Attempts to push
nomadic strength in combat, as they used their mobility beyond this limitation consistently ended in disaster. For
to create chances to “herd and cull” the formations of four and a half millennia, therefore, steppe nomads
sedentary armies using the skills they practiced on mass raided and conquered from a base itself immune to con-
animal hunts on the steppes. quest except by other nomads. Because nomadic strategy
Still, in the right terrain and under competent leader- and tactics were so firmly based in the nomadic lifestyle,
ship, sedentary armies could sometimes defeat nomadic sedentary generals could not adopt them easily. Adop-
forces in battle, using their often superior weight of tion of nomadic techniques therefore usually required use
armor, weaponry, and numbers to break nomadic lines in of nomadic allies by sedentary states, an arrangement
hand-to-hand fighting. The battles of the Crusades that carried its own dangers.
between Frankish knights, who were supported by cross- Given this immunity, the military measures sedentary
bowmen in chain mail, and Turkish horse-riding archers, states took against nomadic threats often centered on
were evenly matched affairs whose outcome depended on various forms of fortifications, since the major weakness
generalship and luck, as each side posed tactical prob- of most nomadic armies (the Mongols being a partial
lems for the other. exception) was, inevitably, siege warfare. Not only were
What increased the challenge posed by nomadic city fortifications built up on the steppe frontier, but
forces was their operational mobility and above all their some states built larger systems of fortification such as
strategic trump card: their base in the steppes. The the various walls that came to form the Great Wall of
armies of sedentary states, which inevitably included China.These were designed less to keep the nomads out
large numbers of infantry, could not hope to keep up (virtually an impossibility) than to slow them on their
with the purely cavalry forces of the steppes: The latter advance and return from a raid, thereby allowing a
could outrun pursuit and avoid battle when it suited their defensive force to bring them to battle. But fortifications
purposes, raiding and withdrawing before opposition were also expensive.