Page 192 - Encyclopedia Of World History Vol III
P. 192

international monetary systems 1011



                                                      Nations have recently been led to borrow billions for war; no nation
                                                       has ever borrowed largely for education. Probably, no nation is rich
                                                    enough to pay for both war and civilization.We must make our choice;
                                                           we cannot have both. • Abraham Flexner (1856–1959)

            guinea at twenty-one silver shillings, a mint price of 3  The Twentieth Century
            pounds, 17 shillings, 10.5 pence per ounce of gold  and Beyond
            (fifteen-sixteenths fine) that was maintained until 1939.  World War I disrupted the gold standard, and was fol-
            Newton overvalued gold and undervalued silver, so, in  lowed by spectacular hyperinflations and exchange
            keeping with Gresham’s Law that bad money drives out  depreciations in Central and Eastern Europe, with the
            good, only gold coins circulated, while silver coins were  German mark stabilized in 1924 at one trillionth of its
            melted down into bullion. In 1752, David Hume       prewar gold value. John Maynard Keynes presciently crit-
            expounded the theory of the specie-flow mechanism    icized Britain’s return to the gold standard at the prewar
            underlying the gold standard: If international trade and  parity in 1925, warning that the deflation of prices and
            payments were unbalanced, gold bullion would flow    wages required to remain internationally competitive at
            from the country with a trade deficit to the one with a  a higher exchange rate would exacerbate unemploy-
            trade surplus, reducing the money supply and price  ment. Following the Wall Street crash of 1929, the fixed
            level in the deficit country and increasing the money  exchange rates of the gold standard transmitted deflation
            supply and price level in the surplus country.The chang-  and depression from country to country, with Britain
            ing relative price levels would reduce the net exports of  forced off the gold standard in 1931 and the United
            the surplus country and raise those of the deficit coun-  States devaluing and ending gold conversion of the dol-
            try until the balance of payments surpluses and deficits  lar in 1933. The Great Depression of the 1930s was a
            were restored to zero. Bank notes were convertible into  period of fluctuating exchange rates, protectionist tariffs,
            coin on demand, and coin or bullion was used for    restrictions on capital flows, and shrinking world trade,
            international settlements, with a bank raising its dis-  a retreat from globalization.
            count rate when a gold outflow threatened the adequacy  At the end of World War II, the international monetary
            of its reserves. By the nineteenth century, the City of  conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, guided
            London was established as the world center of finance  by Lord Keynes and Harry Dexter White, devised a sys-
            and commerce, and the Bank of England as the key insti-  tem of fixed exchange rates, adjustable in case of funda-
            tution of the gold standard.                        mental payment imbalances, with an International Mon-
              The conversion of Bank of England notes was sus-  etary Fund (IMF) to lend foreign exchange, and with the
            pended from 1797 to 1821, and the British government  U.S. dollar as the key reserve currency. The dollar was
            paid for its role in the Napoleonic Wars through infla-  pegged to gold at $35 per ounce, but only other central
            tionary finance, with large increases in national debt stock  banks could present dollars to the Federal Reserve for
            in the hands of the public and of the Bank of England,  redemption in gold. IMF lending, being conditional on
            depreciation of inconvertible Bank of England notes  following policy advice designed to end payment deficits,
            against gold, and a higher price level. Restoration of con-  caused friction between borrowing governments and the
            vertibility at the old parity required a sharp deflation, but  IMF. Although a few nations floated their currencies
            was followed by nearly a century of growing world trade  (notably Canada from 1950 to 1962), the pound sterling
            and largely stable exchange rates (although the United  was devalued in 1949 and 1967, and centrally planned
            States was on an inconvertible “greenback” paper stan-  economies such as the USSR and China stood apart, the
            dard from the Civil War until the start of 1879). The  Bretton Woods system provided a stable framework for
            Latin Monetary Union, a pioneering French-led effort at  expanding global trade and investment flows from 1945
            European monetary unification begun in 1865, linked the  to 1973. Persistent U.S. balance of payments deficits un-
            French, Italian, Belgian, Swiss, Spanish, and Greek cur-  dermined the Bretton Woods system, which was followed
            rencies to a bimetallic standard, but foundered in the face  by a period of exchange rate instability. The Exchange
            of British and German opposition and the shifting rela-  Rate Mechanism, designed to stabilize exchange rates
            tive price of gold and silver.                      among European currencies, collapsed under speculative
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