Page 130 - Carbon Capitalism and Communication Confronting Climate Crisis

10 FIGHTING FOR COAL: PUBLIC RELATIONS … 119

organizations or charities are often publicised in these advertisements in
order to craft a ‘halo effect’ (Coombs 1999b). Political donations to indi-
vidual politicians and political parties can also be considered an inoculation
public relations tactic in that the goal is to build a surplus of goodwill, or
‘rational capital’, which makes it difficult for parliamentarians to enact leg-
islation that might have an adverse commercial impact.
Taken together, inoculation and persuasive advocacy strategies amount
to a ‘carrot and stick’ approach that seeks to support the ongoing opera-
tions of controversial industries. As will be made clear in the following case
studies, the coal industry in Australia has operationalised this ‘reward and
punishment’ approach to great effect, securing the cooperation of parlia-
mentary allies, while punishing those who would seek to legislate against
their financial interests. Moreover, industry advocates have not been shy
about wielding this form of communication power.

CASE STUDY #1: THE FIRST EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME,
2008–2010

During 2008–2009 the newly elected Labor government under Prime
Minister Kevin Rudd tried to pass laws for the CPRS. This emissions
trading scheme proposed to price carbon emissions created in Australia, a
country with the highest per capita emissions in the world. At this point, up
to 75% of all electricity used was created from burning coal, making the
sector one of the biggest polluters. In 2007, before the CPRS was even
introduced, the private electricity generators started issuing warnings of
possible blackouts if an emissions trading scheme was introduced. The
head of the electricity generators’ association stated: ‘There will be real
problems in maintaining a reliable electricity supply.’ According to one
account, as the trading scheme developed, the electricity companies
‘fought back with everything they had… [and] ran a disciplined and
ruthless campaign to undermine public support for the Rudd scheme’
(Chubb 2014, pp. 40–41).
In early 2009, the Labor government released draft laws for the trading
scheme that were immediately attacked by the peak body representing the
mining companies, the Minerals Council of Australia (MCA). The MCA
Chairman, Peter Coates, who was also chairman of the coal mining com-
pany Xstrata, described the trading scheme as ‘crazy stuff’ (Hall 2009). But
the most powerful opposition came from the Australian Coal Association,