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WOMEN’S POLITICAL WORK AND ‘WOMEN’S WORK’ 121
within the rural and semi-rural areas of Anhui, Hebei, Hunan and Tianjin. NPC data
appear more generous in their assessment of women’s participation in politics than those
of Jennings. Jennings suggests a number of possible reasons for the gender gap that study
identified—specifically, the absence of a second (non-farming) occupation among
women, less advantageous social opportunities for girls (for example, in educational
opportunity), low rates of CCP membership among women and a socialization process
that discourages girls and women from an interest in politics. Jennings summarizes rural
women’s low level of interest and participation in politics, saying, ‘Despite having
undergone vast changes in the past five decades, rural China still possesses visible
remnants of a patrilineal, patriarchal and, virilocal society’ (Jennings 1998:971).
Ellen Judd has explained the lower rates of CCP membership among women as partly
deriving from the virilocal marriage customs (women marrying into the home of the
groom) that are prevalent in rural China. Party membership follows a period of scrutiny by
existing Party members, and when women shift villages on marriage this can extend the
period of ‘scrutiny’ as they must insert themselves as strangers into the well-established
social network of their husband’s village (Judd 1994:229). In contrast, Shi Tianjin has
noted that Beijing women participate in elections at a higher rate than Beijing men (Shi
1997:169). Shi suggests that this reflects in part the recognition by urban women of the
direct personal benefits they have garnered as a result of CCP policy (Shi 1997:175). In
addition, it is possible that urban women are more likely to be mobilized to vote because
their work conditions and gender-specific entitlements are more directly influenced by
government policy than those women working on the land.
The difference between rural and urban women’s participation remains difficult to
gauge but a 1993 study revealed a close correlation between level of education and
interest in politics and residential location and interest in politics. Rural women recorded
a lower ‘quality of political consciousness and social responsibility’ than urban women. But
across all categories (levels of education, residential location and age), men expressed
more confidence about their political abilities and knowledge than women (Zhongguo funü
1993:134–7).
Importantly, this study coincided with an increase in the calls for an improvement in
the quality of women politicians and not just an increase in their quantity. Indeed, some
commentators greeted the removal of quotas for women on the basis that it will result in a
higher quality of politicians. In a 1992 article, CCP member Liu Ning blamed the quota
system for poor-quality contributions by women. Liu argued that artificial props to
women’s political engagement simply allowed a lower quality of politics to emerge.
Women’s enhanced participation in politics would require an improvement in education
and political training and not the reinstatement of quotas (Liu Ning 1992:93). In 1992, Li
Weisha noted that one major problem for women politicians was that they were
considered as ornaments (dianzhuipin) to the political stage rather than an integral part of
the process of governance. Li pointed out that the belittling of women’s contributions
partly stemmed from the low quality of their participation. In particular, those women
who were appointed as part of the quota system during the Cultural Revolution made
very poor contributions and therefore lost their positions during the reform process
(Li Weisha 1992:37). The discrediting of Cultural Revolution policies in general over the