Page 104 - Cinematic Thinking Philosophical Approaches to the New Cinema
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94  James  Phillips

        itself  any comprehension  of expropriation  in  pre-Columbian  societies,  is
        directed properly against the spurious autonomy of Brazil. As the country's
        independence  from  Portugal was declared by the Portuguese prince regent
        himself in  1822, the struggle against colonialism, such as it was carried out
        in Algeria and Vietnam, was preempted  rather than won.  Brazil was inde-
        pendent  but a Bragança  still  sat on its throne. A self-assertion  of national
        identity  is not in and of itself the answer.  Rocha  says in a statement  first
        published  in  Positif m  1970: "The seizure  of political  power  by the colo-
        nized  is fundamental.  But the seizure of power is not »enough." 7
             In  Cinema  2:  The Time-Image  Gilles  Deleuze writes of the changed
        political perspective of Rocha, Youssef Chahine, and black American cine-
        ma: "The death-knell  for becoming conscious was precisely the conscious-
        ness that  there  were no people, but  always  several  peoples, an  infinity  of
        peoples, who remained  to be united,  or should not be united,  in order  for
        the problem to change. It is in this way that third world cinema is a cinema
        of minorities,  because the people  exist  only in the condition  of minority,
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        which  is why they are missing."  If the task of third-world cinema is not to
        mobilize  the masses  for the bourgeois  myth  of the sovereign  people,  it is
        just as little to hypostasize the powerlessness of the masses as their essential
        condition  (such  a hypostasis  would  be simply the cynical  complement  of
        the bourgeois  notion  of popular  sovereignty). The problem  to be changed
        will be changed  at its roots by a dismantling  of the concept  of power.
             The essence of cinema  is tied to a future  revolution. Cinema  cannot
        assert  itself  because  it  lies  in  the very  nature  of this  revolution  to  with-
        hold  itself.  In  its  contestational  potentiality,  the  revolution  stands  over
        the  actual  as  its  caveat  and  comes  between  power  and  the  proof  with
        which  power  provides  itself  in  realization.  The  desperation  of  Rochas
        cinema  is both an acknowledgment  of the impossibility of revolution and
        the  modus  operandi  of  this  revolution  with  respect  to  the  ontological
        foundations  of power. The impossibility of the revolution  is not to be con-
        verted into a fact, an aspect of the prevailing state of affairs and a negative
        actuality.  Just  as cinema  cannot  assert  itself,  it  also  cannot  resign  itself
        without  betraying  the  revolutions  radical  objection  to  the  status  quo.
        The  impossibility  of the revolution  is its pure possibility:  it is impossible
        not  because  it  lacks  the  specific  conditions  in which  it could  be actual-
        ized but because  actuality  itself,  in which  beings  are decidable and  lend
        themselves to identification  and control,  is incompatible with it. Possibil-
        ity presses its philosophical  priority.  If,  for Rocha,  cinema  remains to be
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