Page 42 - Cinematic Thinking Philosophical Approaches to the New Cinema
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32  Alexander  Garcfa  Düttmann

        it  is its creation.  Solely on condition  that one can define  art  conceptually,
        subordinate  significance  and  element  to  a  specific  determination—and
        thereby, for example, assess every drifting  apart of significance and element
        as  a  failure,  as a  deficient  spiritualization  of the  sensuous  or  a  deficient
        sensualization  of the spiritual—does  this  conflict  admit  of resolution: the
        prize  for settling the dispute  is however the end of art, thus the reopening
        of the  circle whose closure  is observed.
             In  a certain  respect,  then,  the  understanding  of  a  film  is  never  a
        purely conceptual understanding. One can never reduce a film to its con-
        cept. Art requires  an indirect  address.  Perhaps that  is true  even  of philo-
        sophical  discourse.  If there  is no significance  of the significance,  no  idea
        of the idea, no concept  of art, no spiritual end of art, then the insight,  for
        example,  that  it  is  always  the possible  but  never  the  "immediately  real"
        that  blocks  the  way  to  Utopia,  cannot  be  straightforwardly  separated
        from  the form  of thinking, in the end not even from  its own  formulation.
        The  thought  has become  "flesh  and  blood,"  something  real,  or rather  it
        has not fashioned  itself in a distinct spiritual sphere in order  finally to ex-
        ternalize  itself. The film or the philosophical  text  is an act, an  expression
        of thought  in "flesh and blood" to which in turn  only another act can an-
        swer, another  expression, another philosophical  text or film that  does not
        remain  in  possibility  but  rather  itself  grounds  the reality  or actuality  of
        a circle  of "element"  and "significance."  In this way the "force" to which
        Cavell  refers  communicates  itself. That  also  befits  its inexplicability.
             "Utopia  is blocked  off by possibility,  never by immediate  reality." In
        Visconti  attempts  at  change  founder  as a consequence  of an  orientation
        by the  difference  between  reality  and  possibility. Almost  all of his  films
        revolve around  this  theme. Lo straniero forms  an exception,  L'innocente a
        limited case. In L innocente, Visconti's last film, a man of the world takes it
        for granted that the change has already taken place. What  is at issue is the
        experiment  of a life  beyond  good  and  evil. Treating  the possible  as real,
        this  life  shatters  against  reality  because  the possible  is not real but  rather
        only  an  illusion,  a deception.  It  is not  real  in the sense  of the  prevailing
        society that maintains itself through  double standards. Nor is it real in the
        sense  of a relationship  that  would  be  free  of deceptions  because  it would
        no longer equate freedom  with  permissiveness. The "stranger," the central
        figure  in the  film of Camus'  novel,  passes  over entirely  into  the anonym-
        ity  of the  social  immanence  with  which  he  involuntarily  collides,  in  an
        unexpected  movement  of  exaggeration,  of the  exaggerated  effect  of the
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