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                  Political Communication Systems All Change: A Response to Kees Brants  119

                  schedules are full of Oprah-like talk shows, including the infamous Jerry Springer
                  show.



                  Enter Kees Brants

                  How should scholars relate to this disconcerting trend? Will it drag down the
                  public service standards of European political communication? Is it ultimately
                  corrosive or restorative for engaged citizenship? Kees Brants makes three welcome
                  contributions to these questions.
                    First, he shows that it would be premature for civic-minded Europeans to
                  succumb to a full-blown panic over infotainment. After reviewing published
                  content analyses of the public and private television news services of several
                  European countries, Brants concludes that, in an admittedly mixed picture,
                  traditional standards are still largely being upheld. Public channels have not
                  moved the news to the margins or out of prime-time to compete with popular
                  drama on commercial television. On the contrary, commercial channels differ
                  little from the public schedules and seem to be competing more on terms set by
                  public broadcasters than with different content and formats.
                    Second, Brants offers a promising research tool, termed an ‘infotainment
                  scale’, for further investigation in this area. This codes programmes for the
                  presence of defined informational and/or entertainment characteristics in
                  respect of their topics, styles and formats, ranging in each case from ‘i’ (fully
                  informative), via ‘i/e’ and ‘e/i’ to ‘e’ (fully entertaining). When Brants applies
                  this scale to 16 programmes from seven different television genres that covered
                  the 1994 election campaign in the Netherlands, a hybrid but not dismaying
                  picture emerges. Although the programmes mixed the elements in varying ways
                  and degrees, Brants concludes that the evidence ‘does not point to infotainment
                  taking over’ (p. 329).
                    Third, Brants proposes a discriminating way to evaluate the emergence of
                  infotainment, depending essentially on whether it seems to be getting out of
                  hand. A trend to infotainment would be problematic, he suggests, if: (1) it became
                  the dominant form in which politics was portrayed; (2) it was used by politicians
                  to avoid the professional scrutiny of political journalists; or (3) it distracted
                  audiences from ‘the hard stuff of politics’. And Brants considers that as of now
                  these criteria are far from being violated in European political television.
                    But more needs to be said about four matters dealt with in Brants’ article.



                  Wherefrom the crisis of public communication?


                  First, why have some of us discerned in certain current trends the seeds of a
                  crisis of public communication (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995; Blumler, 1997)?
                  Here Brants misses the point. The nub of our concern is not the march of
                  infotainment, as he seems to suppose. I certainly have no quarrel with the
                  argument that there may be more than one way or one television genre to inform
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