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107                        The  Development  of  Normative  Structures

         requesting  the  person  in  question  to  clarify  his  own  identity.  As
         long  as  he  denies  the  identity  propositionally  ascribed  to  him,
         we  cannot  be  certain  whether  he  is  simply  disavowing  his  identity
         of  is  not  in  a  position  to  sustain  his  identity  (whether  he  has
         perhaps  a  split  personality),  or  whether  he  is  not  at  all  the  person
         we  suspect  he  is  on  the  basis  of  external  characteristics.  There  may
         be  world-shaking  evidence  for  the  bodily  identity  of  a  person;
         but  to  attain  certainty  regarding  the  sdentity  of  the  person,  we
         must  give  up  our  propositional  attitude  and,  in  a  performative
         attitude,  ask  the  one  involved  about  his  identity,  ask  him  to
         identify  Azmself.  In  doubtful  cases  we  have  to  identify  other  per-
         sons  according  to  the  characteristics  through  which  they  identify
         themselves.
           No  one  can  construct  an  identity  independently  of  the  iden-
         tifications  that  others  make  of  him.'”  These  are,  naturally,  identi-
         fications  that  others  make  not  in  the  propositional  attitude  of
         observers,  but  in  the  performative  attitude  of  participants  in  inter-
         action.  Indeed  the  ego  does  not  accomplish  its  self-identifica-
         tions  in  a  propositional  attitude.  It  presents  itself  to  itself  as  a
         practical  ego  in  the  performance  of  communicative  actions;  and
         in  communicative  action  the  participants  must  reciprocally  sup-
         pose  that  the  distinguishing-oneself-from-others  is  recognized  by
         those  others.  Thus  the  basis  for  the  assertion  of  one’s  own  identity
         is  not  really  self-identification,  but  intersubjectively  recognized
         self-identification.
           The  expressions  I  and  thoz  do  not—as  the  personal  pronouns
         in  the  third  person  do—have  the  referential  meaning  of  denota-
         tive  expressions  employed  propositionally.  Rather  they  borrow
         their  referential  meaning  from  the  illocutionary  roles  of  linguistic
         performance;  they  have  primarily  the  meaning  of  personal  self-
         representation  on  the  basis  of  the  intersubjective  recognition  of
         reciprocal  self-representations.  The  expressions  we  and  you  have
         the  same  relation  to  personal  pronouns  of  the  third-person  plural
         as  do  I  and  thow  to  those  of  the  third-person  singular.  But  there
         is  nonetheless  an  interesting  asymmetry.  The  expression  “‘we’’  is
         used  not  only  in  collective  speech  actions  vis-a-vis  an  addressee
         who  assumes  the  communicative  role  of  you,  under  the  reciprocity
         condition  that  we  in  turn  are  you  for  them.  In  individual  speech
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