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Iii                        The  Development  of  Normative  Structures

         ing  the  same.  The  individual  lifetime  too  is  schematized  on  different
         levels  of  cognitive  development;  but  it  is  objectively  bounded,  at  least
         by  birth  and  death.  There  are  no  comparable  objective  cut-off  points
         for  the  historical  existence  of  a  society,  with  its  overreaching  genera-
         tions  and,  often,  epochs.
           b.  Furthermore,  collective  identity  determines  how  a  society  demar-
         cates  itself  from  its  natural  and  social  environments.  In  this  respect
         too,  clear  analogies  [to  individual  life}  are  lacking.  A  personal  life-
         world  is  bounded  by  the  horizon  of  all  possible  experiences  and  actions
         that  can  be  attributed  to  the  individual  in  his  exchange  with  his  social
         environment.  By  contrast,  the  symbolic  boundaries  of  a  society  are
         formed  primarily  as  the  horizon  of  the  actions  that  members  recipro-
         cally  attribute  to  themselves  internally.
           c.  The  third  feature  is  all  the  more  important—collective  identity
         regulates  the  membership  of  individuals  in  the  society  (and  exclusion
         therefrom).  In  this  respect  there  is  a  complementary  relation  between
         ego  and  group  identity,  because  the  unity  of  the  person  is  formed
         through  relations  to  other  persons  of  the  same  group;  and  as  J  men-
         tioned  above,  identity  development  is  characterized  by  the  fact  that
         early  identification  with  concrete  and  less  complex  groups  (the  family)
         is  weakened  and  subordinated  to  identification  with  more  encompass-
         ing  and  more  abstract  units  (city,  state).  This  suggests  that  we  can
         infer  from  the  ontogenetic  stages  of  ego  development  the  comple-
         mentary  social  structures  of  the  tribal  group,  the  state,  and,  finally,
         global  forms  of  intercourse.  Elsewhere  I  advanced  certain  conjectures
         to  that  effect;  °1  but  I  see  now  that  I  underestimated  the  complexity
         of  the  connection  of  collective  identities  with  world  views  and  systems
         of  norms.  Following  Parsons,  we  can  distinguish  cultural  values,  ac-
         tions  systems  in  which  values  are  institutionalized,  and  collectives  that
         act  in  these  systems.  Only  a  certain  segment  of  the  culture  and  action
         system  is  important  for  the  identity  of  a  collective—namely  the  taken-
         for-granted,  consensual,  basic  values  and  institutions  that  enjoy  a  kind
         of  fundamental  validity  in  the  group.  Individual  members  of  the
         group  perforce  experience  the  destruction  or  violation  of  this  norma-
         tive  core  as  a  threat  to  their  own  identity.  The  different  forms  of  col-
         lective  identity  can  be  found  only  in  such  normative  cores,  in  which
         individual  members  “know  themselves  as  one”  with  each  other.

           In  neolithic  societies  collective  identity  was  secured  through  the
         fact  that  individuals  traced  their  descent  to  the  figure  of  a  com-
         mon  ancestor  and  thus,  in  the  framework  of  their  mythological
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