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Introduction                      7

           guidelines  to  govern  transnational  broadcasting.  This  proposal won
           the  consent  of every  country  except  the  United  States.  For  many
           European  and  Canadian  interests,  DBS  represented  the  threat  of
           further  penetration  by  US  mass  media  into  international  markets.
           For  many  less  developed  countries  (LDCs)  - responding  to  the
           ongoing concentration of telecommunication capabilities in relatively
           advanced nation states - a  collective  resistance  to American domin-
           ance  was  formalized  in  a  1973  declaration  drafted  at the first  Con-
           ference  of Ministers  of Information  of Non-Aligned  Countries.  It
           stated that a 'new world communication order' should be organized.
           Recognizing  that  DBS  systems  could  service  LDC  needs  in  mass
           education,  health  care  and agricultural  development,  most  of these
           countries feared  that commercial priorities instead would  lead  to its
           use in extending North-South dependency relations.
             Given the public nature of this conflict, perhaps it is not surprising
           that existing studies of the political-economic history of direct broad-
           cast technologies tend to focus on America against 'the world,' or US
           interests versus  LDC development  aspirations.  These works  are lar-
           gely  descriptive  analyses  of the  international  debates  that  emerged
           through the DBS issue, mainly focusing on the legality and assumed
           implications  of a  successfully  applied  US  free  flow  of information
           policy.  More  critical  scholarly  work  explicitly  or  implicitly  makes
           use  of  the  cultural  imperialism  paradigm  introduced  to  many  by
           Herbert  I.  Schiller  in  1969. 14   With  few  exceptions,  however,  these
           critical  efforts,  despite  the  provocative  and important  issues  raised,
           suffer from the tendency to make theoretical generalizations based on
           political assumptions or inadequate empirical research.
             This  book  is  different.  It  reviews  the  history  of  US  foreign
           communication policy from  the early  1960s to  the  end  of the  1990s
           and focuses  on the relationship of the American state to DBS in  the
           context of the hegemonic crisis facing the US since the early 1970s. Its
           approach involves  a critical reassessment of the cultural imperialism
           paradigm  and  aspects  of work  by  'critical'  and  Gramscian  interna-
           tional  political  economists.  It shows  that  in  the  United  States  the
           corporate proponents  of DBS,  until  recently,  have  been  marginally
           situated in terms of their influence on foreign communication policy.
           In fact, the media conglomerates that most proponents of the cultural
           imperialism  paradigm  believe  were  the  champions  of DBS  were,  at
           various  times,  altogether opposed to  its  domestic  application,  indif-
           ferent  to  its  international  implementation  and  intimidated  by  other
           corporate interests to such an extent that some even conspired against
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