Page 64 - Communications Satellites Global Change Agents

40 IPPOLITO AND PELTON

flict between NASA and the telecommunications industry. This likewise evolved
into a major dispute within the U.S. Congress about who should develop and use
the technology when the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 was debated and
finally adopted after months of heated debate.
As the U.S. institutional framework for satellite services was winding its way
through political processes in Congress toward final resolution in the form of the
Comsat Act of 1962, overseas efforts were just beginning. International contacts
were made to begin the discussions that led to Intelsat, the global satellite entity.
Negotiations were undertaken by the United States with Europe, Canada, Austra-
lia, and Japan, and discussions were even attempted with the USSR. These began
in 1962 and ended after more than 2 years of hard bargaining with the signing in
August 1964 of a new set of international agreements.
These international agreements, which had the force of treaties in some coun-
tries but not in others (including the United States), were signed in Washington,
DC, at the State Department. As a result of the many concerns expressed about
U.S. dominance, especially in Europe, these documents were made interim ar-
rangements for a 5-year trial period. Thus, as political discussions were inching
forward, the technology that would make global communications satellites tech-
nically and economically possible was making great speed. (More about the polit-
ical and institutional meaning of the activity related to the creation, growth, and
operation of Comsat and Intelsat can be found in later chapters and books cited in
the Reference section.)

HUGHES AIRCRAFT "JUMP STARTS" GEOSTATIONARY
SATELLITES

The success of Relay and Telstar inevitably led to the next steps forward. The U.S.
Congress was wrangling about whether NASA should be in charge of satellite com-
munications or whether private enterprise would lead the way forward, but outside
new technology was being developed apace at both NASA and industry.
The scientists at Hughes Aircraft, particularly a brilliant young engineer
named Dr. Harold Rosen, convinced NASA that they could design and build a
GEO communications satellite that could realize the 1945 vision of Arthur
Clarke. This project was known as Syncom, and the NASA contract called for
three of these satellites to be built. The first attempt to launch this new satellite de-
sign resulted in a launch failure, but in late 1963 the Syncom 2 was successfully
launched, followed by Syncom 3 in 1965. The Syncom satellites represented an
immediate triumph for Hughes Aircraft Company, NASA, and the U.S. commu-
nications satellite program. The Syncom launch proved that GEO satellites could
work, and it also demonstrated that global communications satellite systems were
indeed technically feasible. Further, the cost of the satellites, at a few million dol-
lars each, also strongly suggested they were economically viable as well.