Page 155 - Comparing Media Systems THREE MODELS OF MEDIA AND POLITICS

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The Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model

as a private resource, not shared publicly, and this is one of the rea-
sons journalism was slow to develop as an institution. Barrera (1995:
161), for instance, argues that business journalism developed very late in
Spain in part because of the lack of transparency of Spanish business. 19
Clientelism increases the importance of particularistic ties among social
actors, especially – given the centrality of the state and the assumption by
political parties of many of the functions of the individual patrons of an
earlier era – ties to political parties. One of the key differences between
the Mediterranean countries and the Liberal or Democratic Corporatist
systems is that political institutions are more party-politicized. The bu-
reaucracy and judiciary are less separate from party politics than in
systems where rational-legal authority is more fully developed and ties
to parties or factions within them are particularly important to any actor
who needs the cooperation of the state. The regulation of broadcasting is
a good example here: Berlusconi had strong ties to Italy’s Socialist party,
which were crucial to protecting his interests as he built his television
empire. The licensing of commercial broadcasters in Spain has similarly
followed a strongly political logic.
Another good example of the effect of clientelism on the media can be
found in the frequency in Southern Europe of legal proceedings against
media owners. The legacy of clientelism is associated both with a rela-
tively party-politicized judicial system and with a tradition of evasion of
thelaw,“theattitude...thatifonegroupofpeoplehaddiscoveredaprof-
itable evasion, then other groups had better look to their own interests”
(Dennis Mack Smith, quoted in Putnam 1993: 143). In this context, it is
relatively easy for governments to use the legal system to pressure private
actors, including media owners, by threatening selectively to enforce tax
laws and other regulations. In Spain charges were brought against Jes´ us
de Polanco, owner of PRISA, once his Socialist allies were out of power,
and Antonio Asensio maintains that he was threatened with prison if he
did not sell Antena 3 television to Telef´ onica de Espa˜ na (in both cases the
PSOE had previously ignored laws on media ownership to allow the me-
dia empires of these businessmen to expand). Juan Villalonga, the head
of Telef´ onica after its privatization, similarly came under investigation

19 He adds that modern multimedia groups have maintained financial papers even when
they have not been profitable because of the “growing importance of economic in-
formation in the business and political life of the country: to possess a voice in the
market, to possess information for the defense of their own interests is vital for eco-
nomic groups ... which act in sectors which are certainly strategic. Information is
power, we must remember.”

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