Page 283 - Comparing Media Systems THREE MODELS OF MEDIA AND POLITICS
P. 283

P1: GCV
                          0521835356agg.xml  Hallin  0 521 83535 6  January 21, 2004  16:18






                                          The Forces and Limits of Homogenization

                              an earlier period (Panebianco 1988; Mair 1990; Katz and Mair 1994).
                              Mass parties served as central instruments for the representation and
                              defense of social and economic interests, for “aggregating interests” and
                              forming consensus, and served as important structures of communica-
                              tion through the interpersonal networks on which their organizations
                              were built. Mass parties, among their other functions, were responsible
                              for the production of social representations and imagery. In the service
                              of this function they owned and controlled newspapers, and journal-
                              ists working within these newspapers had the duty of spreading and
                              defending the ideas of the party. Journalists’ practices of information
                              gathering, writing, and interacting with readers were rooted to a sig-
                              nificant degree in the ideological framework and party-centered social
                              network to which they belonged. Being at the same time both jour-
                              nalists and political figures, they acted according to models of practice
                              shapedbyspecificpoliticalculturesthatvariedfromcountrytocountry–
                              hence the substantial differences we have found among national media
                              systems.
                                The decline of the mass party, ideologically identified and rooted in
                              distinct social groups, and its replacement by the “catchall” or “electoral-
                              professional party” oriented not primarily toward the representation
                              of groups or ideologies but toward the conquest of electoral market
                              share, has been widely documented in political science (Kirchheimer
                              1966;Panebianco1988).Thestablepsychologicalandsociologicalbonds
                              that once existed between parties and citizens have been weakened in
                              this transformation. Party membership has declined (as have church
                              and trade union membership). So has party loyalty, measured either by
                              identification with political parties or by partisan consistency in electoral
                              behavior, at least in many cases. Voting turnout has declined in many
                              countries. “When partisanship was closely tied to class and religion, the
                              conjoint of social and political identifications provided a very strong
                              incentive for party identifiers to turn out. These linkages, however, have
                              withered in recent years . . .” (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000: 66). The
                              “grassroots” political organizations that once tied parties to citizens have
                              atrophied,whileprofessionalstaffsconcernedwithmediaandmarketing
                              have grown. Individual leaders have become increasingly important to
                              the appeal of parties, while ideology and group loyalties have become
                              less so.
                                The weakening of mass political parties is in turn connected with a
                              wider process of social change, which involves the weakening or frag-
                              mentation of the social and economic cleavages on which mass parties


                                                           265
   278   279   280   281   282   283   284   285   286   287   288