Page 284 - Comparing Media Systems THREE MODELS OF MEDIA AND POLITICS

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TheFutureofthe ThreeModels

were built (Panebianco 1988). The clear lines of social division stressed
originally in Marxist theory and later in the comparative politics liter-
ature of the post–World War II period have declined, some argue, to
the vanishing point, with the result that mass parties have lost their so-
cial basis. A proliferation of social groups with specific economic needs
has grown in importance, making the distinctions between owners and
workers, landowners and peasants, less relevant. One important factor in
this change is the fact that the manufacturing industries in which tradi-
tional working-class organizations were rooted have declined, displaced
by the growing service sector. Perhaps most fundamentally, European
economieshaveexpandedanditseemslikelythatincreasedaffluenceand
the growth of the consumer society resulted in an increasing emphasis
on individual economic success rather than political defense of group
interests. A different, though not necessarily incompatible interpretation
of the effect of economic growth is Ingelhart’s (1977) argument that af-
fluence and the stabilization of liberal democracy led to the rise of “post-
materialist values.” This change in political culture is seen as undercut-
ting the ideological divisions on which the old party system was based
and making individuals increasingly unwilling to defer to the leadership
of traditional organizations. It may in turn be related to the rise of new
social movements raising issues that cut across traditional party lines.
ThesesamefactorscitedbyIngelhart–affluenceandtheconsolidation
of parliamentary democracy within the context of a capitalist economy –
may also be responsible for a marked decline in ideological polarization.
Thereisevidencethattheideologicaldifferencesbetweenpoliticalparties
has decreased (Mair 1997), though we will see later that there also may be
countertrends,anditcannotnecessarilybeassumedthatsuchdifferences
will continue decreasing indefinitely. This is connected with the accep-
tanceofthebroadoutlinesofthewelfarestatebyconservativepartiesand
of capitalism and liberal democracy by the parties of the left. An impor-
tant symbol of the shift would be the “historic compromise” that incor-
porated the Communist Party into the division of political power in Italy
in the 1970s. The literature on “plural” societies such as the Netherlands,
where the various subcultures had separate institutions at the grassroots
level, often notes that the leaderships of these communities became ac-
customed to cooperation and compromise at the level of national state
institutions.
Some accounts of change in European political systems also point to
increased education, which might result in voters seeking information
independently rather than relying on the leadership of political parties.

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