Page 13 - Conflict, Terrorism, and the Media In Asia

2 Benjamin Cole
ratings (Nacos 2002: 9). This suggests that there is a symbiotic relationship
between non-state combatants and the media, but the relationship is actually more
complex. The media might seek sensationalism in order to improve its ratings, but
it also has a vested interest in ensuring the survival of the state. It is rare for a
mainstream media source to champion the goals of a terrorist or revolutionary
group. The media also has close relationships with other powerful actors, such as
political and business interests, and their owners. Therefore non-state combatants
might be able to set the media agenda through using violence, but this does not
necessarily give them influence over the content of media outputs.
This communication process is transactional and bi-directional, since the
combatant both sends and receives communications and the receiver does
likewise. Other audiences may also be involved, which may communicate with
each other and also feed back independently to the combatants. The news media
relays messages beyond the immediate target of the violence to wider audiences,
and also feeds back the reactions of government, victims and society to the
perpetrators of the violence (Tuman 2003: 17–19).
Different groups of non-state combatants can, however, have different
approaches to the issue of publicity and consequently have different relationships
with the media. Publicity can be directed at a variety of audiences for a number
of purposes. At one level, violence can be intended to intimidate public opinion
and political elites in order to elicit a response. At another level, groups need pop-
ular legitimacy in order to recruit members and build political support, which
requires reporting of the groups, goals and ideology. These messages can be
directed at both the combatant’s domestic constituency and an international
audience.
In the same way, and at the same time, governments communicate their own
messages to challenge the legitimacy of the methods, ideology and objectives of
their opponents and to maintain popular and political support. This is typically
achieved through negative reporting of their opponent’s ideology and objectives,
combined with positive reporting of the political and security initiatives that the
government is employing. Again, the mainstream media is the principal mecha-
nism for communicating these messages.
The interconnections between some non-state combatants in Asia means that
communications from a conflict in one state can have a direct impact on commu-
nities and national conflicts of others. The flow of these communications has been
facilitated by the increased globalization of the news media. Al Qaeda has tried
to exploit this in the videos, audiotapes and fax messages that it has released to
the al Jazeera TV network. These messages have attempted to mobilize Muslims
worldwide to fight the US and to support various Muslim communities around
the world which are in conflict with their national governments. Some of these
messages have made specific reference to conflicts in Indonesia, the Philippines,
the Xinjiang region of China as well as the inter-communal violence in the
Gujarat province of India.
Al Qaeda’s use of the media in this way was considered to be such a threat that
the US National Security Strategy, which was published in 2002, stated that the