Page 14 - Conflict, Terrorism, and the Media In Asia

Introduction 3
US had to engage in a ‘battle of ideas’ with al Qaeda as part of its ‘war on terror’
(The White House 2002: 6). Using the media to explain and justify its actions in
the ‘war on terror’ was one of the principal means by which the US aimed to
de-legitimize al Qaeda and build an international consensus to stifle grass roots
support for militant groups. A regionalized and globalized media is therefore one
of the key agents for communicating messages from local conflicts to a broader
regional audience and for communicating US and al Qaeda messages in the ‘war
on terror’ to national audiences in Asia.
A key element in the communication process is how the media helps to shape
public perceptions of combatants and their violence. It does this though the labels
and definitions that it attaches to groups and individuals who engage in violence.
Traditional labels such as ‘terrorist,’ ‘rebel,’ ‘insurgent,’ ‘revolutionary,’ or even
‘bandit’ which are commonly used to describe groups engaged in sub-state con-
flicts have no universally accepted definitions which raises a number of issues for
the media when using them. Since the 1990s analysts have also labelled non-state
combatants as being either ‘religious’ or secular’ in orientation. This is reflected
in the increasing use of the term ‘Islamic terrorism’ since 9/11, despite objections
from Muslim communities.
Definitions and labels are important because they create possibilities for
empowering or taking power away from individuals, groups and actions, mainly by
creating an implicit contrast and comparison between what is acceptable and desir-
able and what is not (Tuman 2003: 33). The vagueness of the popular terminology
has meant that the labels which are attached to different types of violence can be
given a variety of definitions by the media. But these definitions frequently over-
look the fact that extra-legal movements do not rely exclusively on violence but
often pursue their goals by a variety of means including social programmes, propa-
ganda, civil disobedience, or even participating in elections (Guelke 1998: 44–47).
Different conflicts therefore need to be assessed and defined on an individual basis,
which poses a challenge for the media.
In this way, the media plays a dual role between governments and combatants,
or between communities in conflict. The media is not however, a neutral actor that
offers passive communication conduits. Rather, it acts as a ‘gatekeeper’ with the
power to determine what it reports, and equally as important, how it reports it.
Many combatants have learnt to manipulate news media in order to ensure publi-
cation and distribution and to try and influence media outputs in their favour, yet
the news media has the ability to control whether the combatants communicate
their message and can manipulate how it communicates that message (Tuman
2003: 116 and 135).
This relationship between the media and non-state combatants is negatively
influenced by the limitations placed upon media freedom, and states across Asia
have some of the worst records of press freedom in the world. In the Reporters
Without Borders 2004 Ranking of Press Freedom, out of 167 states the
Philippines was ranked 111, Indonesia was ranked 117, India was ranked 120,
Malaysia was ranked 122 and China was ranked 162 (Reporters Without Frontiers
2004). Yet press freedom does not necessarily ensure improved reporting.