Page 46 - Conflict, Terrorism, and the Media In Asia

Struggle for moderate Islam in Malaysia 35
Yet the Malaysian media is not wholly consistent in the use of terminology;
articles in the Malay Mail for instance, have on occasion used the term ‘Islamic
terrorist’. More commonly used labels for the KMM and JI are ‘Islamic militant’or
‘Islamic extremist’ or ‘Islamic radical’. These labels implicitly suggest that the
activities of the KMM and JI have a theological basis but are not terrorist activities.
This lack of consistency within the media conveys conflicting messages. The
de-linking of Islam and terrorism is important as a key element in denying the
militants theological legitimacy. To explicitly confirm that terrorist acts have a
theological underpinning would confer some form of theological legitimacy,
which could undermine one of the cornerstones of the government’s counter-
terrorism policy. Yet the linking of Islam with militant activity in some of the
other terminology specifically confirms that militant activity has a theological
underpinning. Therefore the various labels attached to the KMM and JI can be
argued to both legitimize and de-legitimize the two groups.

Reporting the government message
In order to counteract the potential negative effects of publicizing the causes
which militants groups champion, the government uses the mainstream media
to communicate its counter-terror messages to both public opinion and the mili-
tants. Its counter-terrorism policy focuses on addressing the root causes of vio-
lence in order to win the hearts and minds of the militants and their potential
supporters (Mahathir 2002). To achieve this, the government uses the media to
publicize four key policies that are designed to prevent the radicalization of the
population.
The first is to challenge the objectives of the militants. Just as there is not much
reporting of militant objectives, neither is there a significant amount of overt gov-
ernment rejection of them, but it is nevertheless an aspect of the government
media strategy. Taking one example from 2002, Bernama reported a speech by
Mahatir in which he argued that people resorting to terrorism to create an Islamic
state in Malaysia did not understand the meaning of Islamic nationhood, since
Malaysia is already being administered by people of their own race and religion.
Instead, he urged would-be terrorists to go and fight in those countries where
Muslims were being oppressed. He concluded that using terrorism to gain power
would weaken the country and pave the way for Malaysia to be controlled by
foreigners (Bernama 2002b).
The second policy involves the government portraying itself as a champion of
oppressed Muslims across the world in order co-opt those causes from the mili-
tant agenda. This was reflected in government opposition to the war in Iraq and
support for the Palestinians. In 2003 Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah warned the
international community of the adverse consequences if they failed to tackle three
main areas of Muslim concern: the Iraq issue, the Palestinian–Israeli conflict and
terrorism (Asia Times Online 2003).
This helps to establish the legitimacy of the government as a protector of
Muslim rights and undercuts the support which militant groups might receive on