Page 69 - Conflict, Terrorism, and the Media In Asia

58 Jonathan Woodier
distorts the daily reality. This is something Indonesia can ill afford, given the
importance of the US to its economy. The US is the biggest foreign investor in
Southeast Asia, with direct investments totalling nearly US$90 billion, and its
third largest export market valued at $US50 billion. And international concern
about the security situation in Southeast Asia is very real.
The international media paints a bleak picture of the security situation in
Southeast Asia (Clendenning 2004). And with bombs and terrorist training camps
continuing to rend the reputation of the country and some of its ASEAN partners,
the region looks to be too great a risk for many investors (Associated Press 2004).
Successive Indonesian governments have closed their eyes to the militant threat,
allowing Islamic militias to foment sectarian strife in areas like Maluku and
Sulawesi, and security analysts say JI cells are active in Indonesia (McBeth
2002b: 13). The links with the network of al Qaeda terrorists and to 9/11 archi-
tect Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, were reinforced by the capture of his Southeast
Asian deputy – Indonesian terrorist, Riduan Isamuddin (otherwise known as
Hambali), in Thailand in 2003 (Hussain et al. 2004: 1–2).
Sydney Jones suggests that it is a wide network that includes ‘individuals with
well-established political legitimacy’ for defying Suharto, blurring the lines
between terrorists and political dissidents and Islamic extremists (Wain 2002). In
mid-October 2004 a senior police officer, General Ansyaad Mbai, accused the
press of giving too much ‘visibility’ to Indonesia’s Islamist activists, and of being
responsible for the country’s vulnerability to terrorism (Reporters without
Borders 2004). The atmosphere of threat encourages self-censorship – especially
when reporting on the military and Muslim militants.
However, fears of an Islamist backlash in the run up to the 2004 elections were
unfounded. Despite the bombing of the Australian Embassy, Indonesia’s first
direct presidential election went off relatively peacefully and was praised as a key
step in the country’s transition to democracy after the downfall of Suharto in
1998. President Yudhoyono is expected to tread carefully given the sensitivity of
the Muslim ground and concerns from human rights groups, and in an interview
before his inauguration, he made it clear that in his efforts to combat terrorism,
he would step up dialogues with Muslim groups to ensure that ‘there is no mis-
communication’. However, his landslide victory was seen as indicative of popu-
lar support for his pledge to fight terror and fix Indonesia’s battered economy, and
he said that tougher laws might be needed to crack down on Islamic extremism in
the country (Pereira 2004). What is clear is that his positioning in the media and
his ability to communicate effectively to internal and external audiences will play
a key role in the perceived success of this government in the months to come.

Conclusion

The link between the communications media and political change remains
ambiguous, even in Indonesia, where the media and the control of information
clearly had a role in the creation and the survival of Suharto’s Indonesia, as well
as the collapse of the President’s New Order. While a direct causal link between