Page 4 - Critical Theory of Communication as Critical Sociology of Critique

FUCHS: CRITICAL THEORY OF COMMUNICATION AS CRITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF CRITIQUE IN THE AGE OF DIGITAL CAPITALISM

Williams’ interpretation of Marx, is that communication, ideology, and the use of language are not immaterial
or part of a cultural superstructure, but are specif c forms of social production. The increased relevance of in-
formation work, i.e. the social production of information, underlines the particular importance of non-dualist,
materialist understandings of information and communication. In contemporary thought about communications
and digital media, there is often a dualist separation of technology/content, non-creative/creative, production/
circulation, productive/unproductive, labour/ideology, work/communication, etc.
So I cannot agree with the understanding that for Marx the species-being is the ideal of creativity. I also do not
agree with the assumption that there is an epistemological break in Marx’s works that allows a distinction between
the young, romantic, esoteric Marx and the mature, realist and scientif c Marx. Althusser speaks of this “epistemo-
logical break” as a dividing line that splits “Marx’s thought into two long essential periods: the ‘ideological’ period
before, and the scientif c period after, the break in 1845” (Althusser, 1969, p. 34). The problem is that Althusser
never read Marx. He wrote in his autobiography that he only knew “a few passages of Marx” (Althusser, 1993, p.
165) and that his method of getting to know philosophy was “all done by ‘hearsay’”. He described himself as “a
trickster and deceiver and nothing more, a philosopher who knew almost nothing about the history of philosophy
or about Marx” (Althusser, 1993, p. 148). After having read Marx, in contrast to Althusser, my position is that
throughout his life Marx held a consistent theoretical and political position, and his later works are critical politi-
cal-economic applications of his general critical theory concepts that he developed in his early works.
For example, the notion of the species-being cannot just be found in the early Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts, but also in later Marxian works, such as the Grundrisse and Capital. In the Grundrisse, Marx
(1857/1858, p. 496) argues: “But human beings become individuals only through the process of history. He
appears originally as a species-being”. In Capital, Marx continues his early idea that co-operation is a human
species activity, but he makes clear that the species-being is not a static metaphysical category, but rather that
the human species-being capacities (such as co-operation) develop historically and take on specif c forms under
particular societal circumstances: “When the worker co-operates in a planned way with others, he strips off the
fetters of his individuality, and develops the capabilities of his species” (Marx, 1867, p. 447).
Also, the notion of alienation is not limited to Marx’ early works, but can be found in later works as well,
including Capital (for a more detailed discussion of Marx’s concept of alienation, see Fuchs 2016c, chapter 7):
“Since, before he enters the process, his own labour has already been alienated [entfremdet] from him, appro-
priated by the capitalist, and incorporated with capital, it now, in the course of the process, constantly objectif es
itself so that it becomes a product alien to him [fremdes Produkt]” (Marx, 1867, p. 716).

Creativity, creative industries, anti-work

Jan Løhmann Stephensen argues that, inspired by Marxist humanism, I focus on stressing creativity for all as an
ideal and a political demand. Marxist humanists would argue that “labour minus alienation equals creativity
(plus a lot of other things that were found warranted under capitalism, such as autonomy, sociality, community,
participation, democracy, etc.)” (Stephensen, 2015, p. 160). I would focus on arguing for the replacement of
“alienated labour with unalienated work, which is something that involves Man’s creative powers” (Stephensen,
2015, p. 161) and the demand to “’install’ creativity in work” (Stephensen, 2015, p. 162), etc. Stephensen is
critical of the “extent to which the author associates creativity with freedom” (Stephensen, 2015, p. 162) and
questions the demand of “creativity of all” (Stephensen, 2015, p. 162, p. 165).
Stephensen’s point is that creativity is not automatically a progressive political concept, because it has become
an ideological “pivotal keyword” in what Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) term “the new spirit of capitalism”
(Stephensen, 2015, p. 163). Also, management gurus and consultants, such as Gary Hamel, Richard Florida,
Gary Vaynerchuk, Don Tapscott, Chris Anderson, Kevin Kelly, etc. use concepts like creativity, making, participa-
tion, sharing, the gift, etc. They do so in an ideological manner that reif es capitalism, and they try to subsume
such concepts and the demand that everyone can lead a self-controlled and self-fulf lling life under the logic of

CONJUNCTIONS, VOL. 3, NO. 1, 2016, ISSN 2246-3755 | PAGE 4