Page 9 - Critical Theory of Communication as Critical Sociology of Critique

FUCHS: CRITICAL THEORY OF COMMUNICATION AS CRITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF CRITIQUE IN THE AGE OF DIGITAL CAPITALISM

discussed how we can use the notion of alienation today. I will give an overview of these debates in chapter 5 of
the forthcoming book Critical Theory of Communication: Lukács, Adorno, Marcuse, Honneth and Habermas in
the Age of the Internet and Social Media (Fuchs, 2016c). The chapter will explore how we can use the notion of
alienation in the context of digital media today. I especially found Axel Honneth’s interpretation of Georg Lukács
helpful, and, based on Honneth and Lukács, I have identif ed three forms of reif cation (economic, political and
cultural reif cation) that each have an objective, a subjective and an inter-subjective dimension, which results in
a general matrix of reif cation that can be related to the realm of digital media. The alternative to reif cation is
appropriation. A similar matrix can be constructed for processes of appropriation and be used for discussing
alternatives and struggles in the context of digital media (see Fuchs, 2016c, chapter 5).
I much agree that one should engage with “different readings of Marx especially throughout the 1950s, 60s
and 70s – when this theoretical corpus stood at the centre of huge cultural, philosophical, societal, economic,
and political transformations and debates” (Stephensen, 2015, p. 167) as a foundation for critical theories of
communications and digital media. Such readings do, however, at the same time need a profound understand-
ing of Marx. I personally try to do both, namely to engage with Marx and the history of Marx’s reception. I
have my own preferences in terms of specif c theorists in this respect (e.g. Lukács, Frankfurt School, Raymond
Williams, Dallas Smythe), but it is of course a much needed, welcome and encouraged endeavour that scholars
explore foundations of different Marxist approaches in order to improve their critical understanding of contem-
porary communications.
There has been an interesting and insightful debate about how to conduct critical theory between Axel
Honneth and Luc Boltanski. Honneth invited Boltanski to give the 2008 Adorno lectures in Frankfurt. In these
lectures, Boltanski (2011) distinguished his approach of a pragmatic sociology of critique from critical sociology.
In France, Pierre Bourdieu especially would have taken the latter approach. But in this view, the Marxist tradition
can generally be described as being close to critical sociology, which tries to unmask domination, exploitation
and oppression as well as ideologies justifying these phenomena (Boltanski, 2011, p. 6). Boltanski describes
his approach of the pragmatic sociology of critique as “rigorous empirical sociology” (p. 23), which does not
assume an asymmetry between the sociologist and ordinary people and aims to describe the reality and experi-
ences of the oppressed. It would make use “of the point of view of the actors […], their ordinary sense of justice,
to expose the discrepancy between the social world as it is and as it should be in order to satisfy people’s moral
expectations” (p. 30). Boltanski criticises that critical sociology in his view has an “overarching character” and
a “distance at which it holds itself from the critical capacities developed by actors in the situations of everyday
life” (p. 43). The pragmatic sociology of critique would fully acknowledge “actors’ critical capacities and the
creativity with which they engage in interpretation and action en situation” (p. 43) for “denunciations of injus-
tice” (p. 37).
In a conversation with Honneth (Boltanski & Honneth, 2009), Boltanski points out that his approach is not to
denounce Marxism, as Bruno Latour does, but to take it in a new direction. Accordingly, Boltanski says that, in his
view, Bourdieu’s approach saw domination everywhere and did not see the immanent contradictions of society.
Honneth argues that Habermas, whom he considers as his main inf uence, has seen Horkheimer and Adorno’s
approach as a total critique where everything is domination. The conversation makes clear that Boltanski takes
an explicitly empirically grounded approach, whereas Honneth has developed a moral philosophy. Honneth ar-
gues that the reality of actors who use critical capacities would be unequally distributed so that critical sociology
would have to analyse the limits that social conditions pose for humans (pp. 105-106).
Boltanski argues that his approach does not use moral philosophy and normative critique, but assumes that
there are immanent contradictions in reality. He says that there is always something in the world that “goes be-
yond reality” (Boltanski & Honneth, 2009, p. 107). Boltanski writes that ideologies are something that only those
in power need, whereas everyday people make many experiences that go beyond ideology (p. 108).
Boltanski (2011) terms normative critical theory “meta-critical theory” (p. 8) or metacritique (p. 6), because
it would need an exteriority in order for us to be able to judge what is good and bad. He argues for a purely

CONJUNCTIONS, VOL. 3, NO. 1, 2016, ISSN 2246-3755 | PAGE 9