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Media as Mathematics - Calculating Justice 145

domains, is not addressed: however the potential of deep philosophical
understanding of the images and process of such media is certainly prefigured
and conceptualized in the work of all three authors. Through appropriation of
the seminal thinking of Peirce, such understanding of digital media can be
conceptualized in terms of a semiotic theory of mathematics. Peirce affords a
flexible solution to the long-standing problem of the commensurability of
verbal and non-verbal language, by locating various forms of reasoning –
mathematical and verbal – within his elaboration of three categories or
function of signs.

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