Page 61 - Creating Spiritual and Psychological Resilience
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30             Creating Spiritual and Psychological Resilence

              The second basic belief derived from emotion theory that I find extremely
            useful is the idea that, fundamentally, emotions are adaptive. “Emotions
            have motivational functions that give them critical adaptive qualities; for
            example, interest gives focus and selectivity to perception; fear and antici-
            patory shame protect from physical and psychological harm; guilt moti-
            vates moral reasoning, empathy, and reparation of damaged relationships;
            and joy works as an antidote for stress and a stimulus to social interaction
            and creative thinking” (Izard, 2001, p. 253).
              Understanding  the  emotions  as  fundamentally  adaptive  has  broad
            human implications. It shapes our notions of the helper’s goals, methods,
            and the meaning of progress. This view of emotionality affects how we
            define normality and pathology and affects our focus in our efforts to work
            with people. What we see as important, worthy of our attention, memo-
            rable, and so on, depends on our basic stance toward human emotionality.
            Henry Krystal (1975) has been critical of what he calls “riddance” theories
            that assume it is always a goal to diminish emotionality. In teaching, I
            have referred to the implicit “pus theory of emotions” that I believe many
            clinicians (and nonclinicians) hold. It was especially popular in the 1970s
            to believe that if we could express (rather than suppress) anger in treat-
            ment, we would be cured of our troublesome emotions. To me, this reflects
            an antiemotionality prejudice.
              Along with the concept that the emotions are fundamentally adaptive,
            I also believe that every emotion has an optimal range of intensity. Too
            little, even of painful agitation, is as much of a problem as too much. We
            would probably be as concerned if an infant never cried as we would be
            if crying took up her whole waking life. I don’t assume my aim should be
            to cure anyone of their intense feelings although, eventually, we may try
            to help someone be better able to modulate them. I begin with a relatively
            unformulated sense that a person’s agitation is her current (perhaps often
            ineffective) emotional language.
              The  belief  that  emotions  are  fundamentally  adaptive  has  especially
            important implications for how we define ideal health in human beings.
            For example, many behavioral and cognitive approaches would see agita-
            tion as a symptom and something to cure. This pits one aspect of a human
            being against another aspect. If I am working to cure a person of her agi-
            tation, I am working to cure her of a part of her. Bromberg (1998) has
            been especially clear about how such a position can become problematic.
            Referring to Freud’s treatment of Emmy von N, Bromberg says:
               Even though she welcomed his trying to “cure” her, she didn’t want him to
               “cure” her of being herself. She was “unruly” because she needed to get all of
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