Page 49 - Cultural Studies and Political Economy

38 Chapter One

thereby permitting the flowering of knowledge unencumbered by “monopo-
lies.” One such period was the golden age of Greece, when Plato inscribed the
hitherto oral Socratic dialogues. 166
For the contemporary period, Innis proposed a recursive (non-determinist,
dialectical) relationship among culture, knowledge, and political-economic
power. On the one hand, political-economic power exerts influence over sci-
ence, affecting scientific research agendas and possibly causing scientists to
distort their findings; on the other, even when impeccably carried out, science
disfigures culture.
To illustrate the first claim, recall scientists in the employ of tobacco, 167
drug, 168 and certain oil companies, 169 who for pecuniary reasons apparently
skewed “findings” concerning health or environmental consequences of their
benefactors’ activities and products. 170 Innis himself proposed that “the bias
of economics . . . makes the best economists come from powerful coun-
tries,” 171 indicating that in his view mainstream economics favors the wealthy
in their contestations with the poor. He drew attention also to the close con-
juncture between science and the military, writing: “The universities are in
danger of becoming a branch of the military arm.” 172 The irony and tragedy
of science, as he saw it, was that once it became free from the monopolies
controlling time (a victory represented symbolically, perhaps, by Galileo’s ul-
timate victory in his contestations with the Church), science succumbed to the
monopolies controlling space (the military and commercial organizations). 173
Much more could and should be said about this aspect of Innis’ political
economy of knowledge thesis, and I pursue that general theme further in
chapter 4. Now, however, I turn to the second issue: how science acts recur-
sively on culture. Innis wrote,

The impact of science on cultural development has been evident in its contribu-
tion to technological advance, notably in communication and in the dissemina-
tion of knowledge. In turn it has been evident in the types of knowledge dis-
seminated; that is to say, science lives its own life not only in the mechanism
which is provided to distribute knowledge but also in the sort of knowledge
which will be distributed. 174

The manifestation, the making concrete, of scientific knowledge in new
technologies is obvious enough: Internet, satellites, television, radio, and
other “mechanisms . . . to distribute knowledge” may inspire awe just by their
very presence, irrespective of content or the ostensible “messages.” The
evolving media infrastructure may well affect also one’s view regarding the
strength and nature of the existential constraints imposed by time and
space. 175 Innis’ second point, namely that new media are inherently biased or