Page 168 - Cultural Theory and Popular Culture an Introduction
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                152   Chapter 7 Gender and sexuality

                      is that it has already been appropriated by the culture industries for its own purposes
                      of profit maximization. However, drawing on the work of Bourdieu, Ang argues that
                      populism is related to the ‘popular aesthetic’, in which the moral categories of middle-
                      class taste are replaced by an emphasis on contingency, on pluralism, and above all, on
                      pleasure (see Chapter 10). Pleasure, for Ang, is the key term in a transformed feminist
                      cultural politics. Feminism must break with ‘the paternalism of the ideology of mass
                      culture . . . [in which w]omen are ...seen as the passive victims of the deceptive mess-
                      ages of soap operas . . . [their] pleasure . . . totally disregarded’ (118–19). Even when
                      pleasure is considered, it is there only to be condemned as an obstruction to the fem-
                      inist  goal  of  women’s  liberation.  The  question  Ang  poses  is:  Can  pleasure  through
                      identification with the women of ‘women’s weepies’ or the emotionally masochistic
                      women of soap operas, ‘have a meaning for women which is relatively independent of
                      their political attitudes’? (133). Her answer is yes: fantasy and fiction do not

                          function in place of, but beside, other dimensions of life (social practice, moral
                          or political consciousness). It . . . is a source of pleasure because it puts ‘reality’ in
                          parenthesis,  because  it  constructs  imaginary  solutions  for  real  contradictions
                          which  in  their  fictional  simplicity  and  their  simple  fictionality  step  outside  the
                          tedious complexity of the existing social relations of dominance and subordina-
                          tion (135).

                      Of course this does not mean that representations of women do not matter. They can
                      still be condemned for being reactionary in an ongoing cultural politics. But to experi-
                      ence pleasure from them is a completely different issue: ‘it need not imply that we are
                      also bound to take up these positions and solutions in our relations to our loved ones
                      and friends, our work, our political ideals, and so on’ (ibid.).

                          Fiction and fantasy, then, function by making life in the present pleasurable, or
                          at least livable, but this does not by any means exclude radical political activity
                          or consciousness. It does not follow that feminists must not persevere in trying
                          to  produce  new  fantasies  and  fight  for  a  place  for  them. . . . It  does,  however,
                          mean that, where cultural consumption is concerned, no fixed standard exists for
                          gauging the ‘progressiveness’ of a fantasy. The personal may be political, but the
                          personal and the political do not always go hand in hand (135–6).

                         In an unnecessarily hostile review of Watching Dallas,Dana Polan (1988) accuses
                      Ang of simplifying questions of pleasure by not bringing into play psychoanalysis. He
                      also claims that Ang’s attack on the ideology of mass culture simply reverses the valu-
                      ations implicit and explicit in the high culture / popular culture divide. Instead of the
                      consumer of high culture imagining ‘high taste as a kind of free expression of a full sub-
                      jectivity always in danger of being debased by vulgar habits’, Ang is accused of pre-
                      senting ‘the fan of mass culture as a free individual in danger of having his/her open
                      access to immediate pleasure corrupted by artificial and snobbish values imposed from
                      on high’ (198). Polan claims that Ang is attacking ‘an antiquarian and anachronistic
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