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190 LANGUAGE

              relationship that is, as usual, anything but simple exteriority. The meaning
              of the outside was always present within the inside and vice versa. 16
            What is at stake here is not simply a relationship between speech and writing; it
            is the very status of the signified and signifier in Saussure’s concept of the sign.
            For if writing affects speech, and if writing is to speech as a signifier is to a
            signified,  then it  follows that the  signifier  is constitutive of the signified  or,
            conversely,  that the ‘transcendental signified’  itself  is at risk. In fact, Derrida
            argues that the concept of the signified falls with the critique of representation
            because  ‘this reference to  the  meaning of a  signified,  thinkable and possible
            outside of all signifiers, remains dependent upon the onto-theo-teleology
            (logocentrism) that I have just evoked’. 17
              The significance  of Derrida’s argument  is that it  makes  possible a critical
            perspective on the whole problematic of the sign. It enables reconsideration of
            the semiological tradition, which derives its method from Saussurean linguistics
            and is based on a concept of representation. For example, Barthes’s distinction
            between ‘language’ and ‘metalanguage’ (or myth) is premised on the assumption
            that the latter ‘re-presents’ the former. In the reality  effect, which Barthes
            attempts to theorize, myth works on the basis of the primary linguistic sign, the
            level of denotation, which has the implicit status of a transcendental signified to
            which myth refers. The point which can be drawn from Derrida’s critique is that
            if the mechanisms of representation are at work in the production of ideology,
            these mechanisms  are themselves ideological. There can be  no  primary
            denotation, no unified sign to be represented, except in logocentric discourse.
              Derrida replaces  the  a priori fixed  signifieds of Saussure’s  theory,  which
            writing represents, by a concept of ‘differance’. He uses the term to signify the
            double meaning of the French word differénce: the differing and  deferring of
            meaning. It is the shared principle by which both speech and writing function
            and, as such, enables spoken language to be reformulated in written discourse
            and vice versa. In Saussure’s theory meaning functions according to the principle
            of the difference between signs in the language chain. This difference is between
            fixed signifieds which stand in a relation of non-identity to one another. Derrida
            transforms and extends this principle. Meaning is  no  longer a  function of the
            difference between fixed signifieds. It is never fixed outside any textual location
            or spoken utterance and is always in relation to other textual locations in which
            the signifier has appeared on other occasions. Every articulation of a signifier
            bears within it the  trace  of  its previous articulations. There is  no fixed
            transcendental signified, since the meaning of concepts is constantly referred, via
            the network of traces, to their articulations in other discourses: fixed meaning is
            constantly deferred.
              There is, currently, a reading of Derrida which would go so far as to reject any
            concept of ‘representation’ to describe all types of discourse. Undoubtedly, some
            of Derrida’s own formulations encourage this kind of reading—in particular, his
            insistence on the total autonomy of texts, which may refer to one another but not
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